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CAN APPLES BE COMPARED TO ORANGES?
A POLICY-BASED APPROACH FOR DECIDING
WHETHER INTENTIONAL TORTS SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN COMPARATIVE FAULT
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a man is sued civilly for raping a woman.1 Suppose further
that the State with jurisdiction over this matter allows intentional torts to
be compared with negligent acts when allocating liability under
comparative fault.2 During the proceedings, the defendant alleges that
the victim behaved negligently by dressing suggestively and not taking
reasonable precautions for her own safety.3 Should the defendant be
allowed to shift liability to the plaintiff for her negligence?
Providing one answer to the foregoing question, Justice Daniel
Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court concluded the following:
Comparing a defendant’s negligence and a rapist’s
intentional tort results in an absurdity; it is a comparison
of unlikes, of apples and oranges. . . .
The legal
obligation not to assault or rape is absolute. The law
does not impose on a victim a duty to avoid a criminal
act by another.4
The State in the hypothetical allows comparisons between the
intentional and negligent acts of the parties. Consequently, if the fact
finder decides that the plaintiff was negligent for failing to protect
herself, the defendant would be able to reduce his liability by the
plaintiff’s percentage of fault. Although this may seem harsh in its
result, some states have adopted similar approaches.5

See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing this hypothetical to illustrate problems of comparing
intentional and negligent torts when allocating fault among parties in a lawsuit).
2
See infra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the states that do allow intentional
torts in their comparative fault schemes).
3
See Field, 952 P.2d at 1083.
4
Id. at 1088.
5
See Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (permitting a defendant
that was sued for assault to reduce his liability by the plaintiff’s negligence of drinking and
engaging in disruptive behavior); see also Blazovich v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991)
(reducing the liability of a group of defendants who physically assaulted and battered the
plaintiff by the plaintiff’s provocation and disruptive behavior).
1
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Now consider the same facts and jurisdiction as before, except that
the negligent party is a co-defendant.6 Defendant A is the rapist who
committed the intentional act, and Defendant B is the owner of the
publicly accessible property where the rape took place.7 If the fact finder
finds that the owner is negligent for not providing enough security and
lighting on the property, should the rapist be able to reduce his liability
in an amount equivalent to the property owner’s negligence?
Justice Rosalie E. Wahl of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
in such a situation, the intentional tortfeasor should not be able to shift
any of his liability.8 She stated that, “[w]here society wants certain
conduct absolutely prohibited and discouraged,” such as intentional
assaults, “apportionment of fault is not appropriate.”9 Notwithstanding
this position, once again, the rapist in the hypothetical presented above
would be able to reduce his liability by the owner’s negligence because
the jurisdiction allows comparisons between negligent and intentional
torts. Is this a fair and just result? Furthermore, what if the rapist is an
unknown party or is insolvent, leaving only the owner of the property
available to pay the plaintiff’s damages? If the fact finder decides that
both defendants are at fault, should the owner be responsible for the
entire amount of damages or only his percentage of attributable fault?
The purpose of this Note is to answer these hypothetical questions
by creating an analytical framework from which to view various policy
goals of tort law. Accordingly, Part II provides background information
for understanding this issue by discussing its common law roots,10 the
expansion and progression of pertinent legal principles,11 and various
attempts throughout history to uniformly approach this issue.12 Part III
explores several modern policy goals of tort law helpful for analyzing
whether to include intentional torts when applying the doctrine of
comparative fault.13 Part IV proposes a model statute that prohibits
See Field, 952 P.2d at 1079 (Utah 1998) (detailing the facts of the case as the rape of the
plaintiff on the property of the defendants being sued for negligence).
7
See id. (describing a parallel fact pattern as the issue in the case with respect to the
defendants).
8
See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the fraud of the
defendant could not be reduced by the plaintiff’s negligence).
9
Id. at 175–76.
10
See infra Part II.A (chronicling the common law heritage of comparative negligence
and how it has expanded beyond solely negligence claims in some states).
11
See infra Part II.B (describing the varying approaches adopted by different states
throughout the country).
12
See infra Part II.C (detailing where the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the
Restatement stand on this issue).
13
See infra Part III (analyzing the issue of including intentional torts using Johnson and
Gunn’s list of tort policy goals as a framework).
6
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comparisons between intentional and negligent torts.14 Finally, Part V
offers a brief conclusion as to why intentional torts should not be
included in states’ comparative fault schemes.15
II. BACKGROUND
One of the primary functions of tort law is to compensate victims for
damages resulting from another’s wrongdoing.16 Indeed some scholars
argue that this is the highest priority in a tort law system.17 Criminal law
seeks to remedy offenses against the public at large, and tort law
provides individual relief to plaintiffs for personal losses suffered for
which criminal law provides no remedy.18 This creates tension,

See infra Part VI (constructing a model statute that draws distinct lines between
intentional misconduct and negligent acts, and precludes any comparisons between the
two).
15
See infra Part V (summarizing the conclusions of this Note regarding why intentional
torts should not be included in comparative fault).
16
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). The Restatement states the
following as the primary purposes of tort law:
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are based
upon the purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable. These
purposes are:
(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms;
(b) to determine rights;
(c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and
(d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful
self-help.
Id.
17
See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J.
585 (March 2003) (arguing that the main drive of tort law is victim compensation, and this
notion is supported by important legal authority, such as the Restatement of Torts). In this
article, Geistfeld describes what he calls the “compensatory norm” of understanding tort
law. Id. at 587. He states that this is defined as “one's security interests over another’s
liberty interests . . . .” Id. He explains that, “[i]n light of that priority, the tort system must
adequately protect physical security while allowing risky behavior.” Id. As a result, this
priority implies that for any risky interaction between two people, “the potential ‘victim’ is
the party facing a threat to her physical security, whereas the potential ‘injurer’ is the one
whose exercise of liberty creates that threat.” Id. at 587-88. Before performing the risky act
in the ideal situation, the potential injurer would get the potential victim’s consent and the
potential victim would agree to assume the risk only if she was fully compensated. Id.
However, because consensual risky interactions are not ordinarily feasible, tort law exists
to provide compensation for the nonconsensual risks that result in injury. Id.
18
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (5th ed.
1984) (stating that torts are commenced and maintained by injured persons to be
compensated for the damages they have suffered at the expense of a wrongdoer).
However, these authors later suggest that, “[i]t is perhaps more accurate to describe the
primary function as one of determining when compensation is to be required.” Id. at 20.
Because “[c]ourts leave a loss where it is[,] unless they find good reason to shift it[,]” tort
14
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however, because a court will compensate a victim only when it finds a
good reason to do so, such as when fault can be attributed to a
defendant.19 Nevertheless, the need for victim compensation remains an
ever-present drive of the American tort system.20
This goal, to remedy a victim’s injuries, underlies the three bases of
tort liability: intentional misconduct, negligence, and strict liability.21
Traditionally courts have treated these bases separately and distinctly.22
But many courts struggle to maintain firm barriers because each of these
three bases overlaps and runs into the others.23 One such situation has
arisen in the context of comparative fault and whether it applies to
intentional torts.24 Where comparative analysis was once reserved for
only negligent acts, some states are now expanding the reach of their
systems to include other forms of misconduct.25 The effects of these
reforms on plaintiff recovery can be significant in scope.26
To more fully illustrate the issues created by including intentional
torts in comparative fault analysis, a review of how comparative fault
developed and expanded is warranted. Therefore, Part II.A of this Note
chronicles the common law roots of comparative fault and its expansion
beyond negligence.27 Second, Part II.B describes how comparative fault
law will not compensate a victim unless there is first a showing of fault or some other form
of liability. Id.
19
Id. at 20 (stating that “[c]ourts leave a loss where it is[,] unless they find good reason
to shift it.”).
20
Id. at 6 (explaining that the purpose of tort law is to adjust the losses arising out of
human activities to provide compensation to injured persons harmed by the conduct of
another).
21
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2-2 (1994). More specifically, the
three bases of liability can be characterized as:
1. Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff’s interests.
2. Negligence.
3. Strict liability, or liability “without fault,” where the defendant is
held liable in absence of any intent which the law finds wrongful,or
any negligence.
Id. See also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (arguing that tort law exists to compensate
victims of accidents and injury).
22
See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the states that refuse to compare
torts from these different spheres).
23
See infra Part II.B (discussing the struggle that states are faced with in fashioning laws
to either include intentional torts into, or exclude them from, their comparative fault
schemes).
24
See id.
25
See infra Part II.B (listing and discussing the different approaches to comparative fault
by the states).
26
See infra Part III.B (analyzing how including intentional torts results in plaintiffs being
denied adequate and equitable compensation for their injuries).
27
See infra Part II.A (discussing contributory negligence and its development into
modern-day comparative fault).
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exists in individual states and how it has been addressed in view of
intentional misconduct.28 Third, Part II.C briefly reviews prior attempts
to bring uniformity to this issue.29 Finally, Part II.D provides a list of
important public policy goals inherent in tort law that help in deciding
whether intentional torts should be included in states’ comparative fault
schemes.30
A. From Contributory Negligence to Comparative Fault
The common law dealt harshly with plaintiffs who played any part
in causing their own injuries.31 Under the common law, if a plaintiff’s
own negligence contributed to his injury, no matter how slightly, he
would be completely barred from recovering any damages from a
negligent defendant.32 Parts II.A.1–2 discuss how courts have attempted
to ameliorate the stringent rule of contributory negligence and replace it
with a more equitable rule of comparative negligence that is more
favorable to plaintiffs’ recovery.33 Part II.A.3 describes how some states
have expanded their comparative negligence schemes to include types of
fault other than negligence.34

28
See infra Part II.B (listing and discussing the different approaches to comparative fault
by the states).
29
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Restatement and the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act).
30
See infra Part II.D (detailing Johnson and Gunn’s list of important policy goals for tort
law that will be used as a framework for analysis).
31
See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809) (establishing the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence). See also DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 233 (West 1985).
Discussing this decision, Dobbs wrote:
[f]rom Butterfield v. Forrester the courts developed the rule of
contributory negligence as a complete defense. Even relatively minor
failure of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care for his own safety
would be a bar to any recovery. This picture did not change even if
the defendant’s negligence was extreme, so long as it fell short of a
reckless or wanton act.
Id.
32
SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 5 (stating that under contributory negligence, if a
plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the happening of an accident, he could not recover any
damages from a negligent defendant who injured him).
33
See infra Parts II.A.1–2 (detailing the creation of contributory negligence and its
development into comparative negligence).
34
See infra Part II.A.3 (describing how some states have expanded their allocation
systems to include types of fault other than negligence, such as strict liability and
intentional acts).
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Common Law Contributory Negligence

The doctrine of contributory negligence has its roots in the early
nineteenth-century English case of Butterfield v. Forrester.35 In that case,
the plaintiff was speeding on his horse when he hit an obstruction in the
road that had been left by the defendant.36 The plaintiff fell off his horse
and suffered injuries.37 When the plaintiff brought an action for
damages against the defendant, the court held that he could not recover
due to his own negligence in riding too fast.38 The decision in Butterfield
established a precedent for the doctrine of contributory negligence that
denied plaintiffs any compensation if they were at fault for any portion
of their own injuries.39 Shortly thereafter, United States jurisdictions
began to adopt and apply this doctrine.40
35
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). Although many commentators claim that this case
established the doctrine of contributory negligence that later gave rise to comparative
negligence, Victor E. Schwartz suggests that comparative negligence may actually have
been developed earlier than contributory negligence. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 4–5.
He suggested that, “[t]he Butterfield court was not bound to select this rule. There was
precedent in the law of admiralty for comparative negligence as a method of handling the
case in which a plaintiff was at fault.” Id. at 5.
36
Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
37
Id.
38
Id. In the court’s reasoning, Lord Ellenborough stated that, “[a] party is not to cast
himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself
of it, if he do [sic] not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right.” Id. He
continued by explaining that if a person rode on the wrong side of the road, that would not
authorize someone else to intentionally ride up against that person. Id. In other words,
“[o]ne person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for
himself.” Id. Consequently, in order for the plaintiff to be able to recover damages, Lord
Ellenborough concludes that there must be both an obstruction in the road by the fault of
the defendant, and there must be “no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the
plaintiff.” Id.
39
Id. Describing how this doctrine functioned as a defense to a defendant’s negligence,
Prosser and Keeton explained that contributory negligence occurs when the plaintiff
contributes to the harm that he has suffered, which conduct “falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at
451. However, unlike assumption of risk, contributory negligence is not based upon the
idea that the defendant is relieved of his duties toward the plaintiff. Id. Rather, even
though the defendant has breached his duty, the plaintiff is denied recovery because his
own fault precludes him from maintaining the lawsuit. Id. at 452. Consequently, the law
views both parties at fault and allows the defense to be “one of the plaintiff’s disability,
rather than the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 452.
40
See Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (Mass. 1824) (holding that a negligent
plaintiff who overloaded his horse’s carriage and drove recklessly could not recover
damages for injuries caused to his horse by the defendant’s woodpile). See also W. Union
Tel. Co. v. Hoffman, 15 S.W. 1048 (Tex. 1891). In Hoffman, the plaintiff brought a negligence
claim against Western Union for failure to deliver a telegram to a family doctor. Id. The
plaintiff alleged that such failure caused his minor son to lose his arm after it had been
broken, the treatment of which had been the reason the plaintiff sent the telegram. Id. The
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The Emergence of Comparative Negligence

Although contributory negligence was the rule in the United States
for some time, courts began to determine that its results were too harsh
on plaintiffs.41 Under contributory negligence, a plaintiff who was one
percent at fault for causing his injuries recovered absolutely nothing.42
Describing how this stringent rule may have come about, Lou Dobbs
wrote, “[s]ometimes a seemingly incomplete or irrational rule is simply
the result of conceptual failure—an inability to put together a coherent
idea of what the rule ought to be.”43 As states began to recognize the
inherent unfairness of contributory negligence, notions of comparative
negligence developed and were adopted.44
Comparative negligence differs from contributory negligence in that
it permits a culpable plaintiff to recover damages from a defendant for a
portion that does not include the plaintiff’s own percentage of fault.45 In

Supreme Court of Texas held that because the plaintiff could have sent another message or
procured other medical assistance, he could not recover against Western Union. Id.
41
See, e.g., Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the legislative
decision to adopt comparative negligence was to ameliorate the harsh results of
contributory negligence).
42
Id. (stating that under contributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff was precluded
from recovering damages “even when . . . [his] negligence was substantially less than the
defendant’s.”).
43
See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 234 (1985). Although Dobbs offers one explanation of
the creation of contributory negligence, Prosser and Keeton described other theories that
have been proffered for this doctrine. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 452. One theory is
that contributory negligence has a “penal basis” and exists to deny a plaintiff recovery to
punish him for his misconduct. Id. Another theory is that the law requires a plaintiff to
come into court with “clean hands.” Id. Some have also said that contributory negligence
is founded upon voluntary assumption of the risk. Id. However, Prosser and Keeton
suggest that this theory is unsound because negligence can exist without knowing the risk
of the behavior. Id. Last, contributory negligence has also been explained in terms of
proximate causation because “the plaintiff’s negligence is an intervening, or insulating,
cause between the defendant’s negligence and the result.” Id.
44
See infra notes 45–58 and accompanying text (discussing the move in this country from
contributory negligence to comparative negligence).
45
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(1) (stating that the effect of contributory fault is that
“any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount
awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury attributable to the
claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”). Furthermore, the Iowa
comparative fault statute states the following:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by a claimant to
recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or
property unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than
the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, thirdparty defendants and persons who have been released pursuant to
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the United States, at least three basic systems have developed.46 First, a
number of jurisdictions have adopted what is called the “pure” form of
contributory negligence.47 This system of contributory negligence
permits a plaintiff to recover against a defendant even if his negligence
rises to a greater proportion than that of the defendant’s; however, the
plaintiff’s damage award is reduced by his percentage of fault.48
Second, some states use a modified system of comparative
negligence that can take one of two forms.49 There is the “forty-nine
percent” system that allows a plaintiff to recover only if his fault is less
than that of the defendant’s, i.e., less than fifty percent.50 If his fault is
section 668.7, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the claimant.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(1)(a).
46
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 32–33; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 471–74.
The three forms of comparative fault are the pure form, the modified form, and the slightgross system.
47
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.060, 09.17.900; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81; LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2323; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d
886 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1983); Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
48
Lee A. Wright, Comment, Utah’s Comparative Fault Apportionment: What Happened to
the Comparison?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 552 (1998). Wright explains how this system
functions by stating, “[u]nder this approach, a plaintiff’s recovery is diminished by the
plaintiff’s percentage of negligence, regardless of which party bears the greater portion of
fault.” Id. Describing this system further, Prosser and Keeton stated that “a plaintiff’s
contributory negligence does not operate to bar his recovery altogether, but does serve to
reduce his damages in proportion to his fault.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 472. This
aim of the system is to compensate injured plaintiffs for all of the harm attributable to the
defendant’s wrongdoing. Id. In the case of multiple defendants, “all are liable to the
plaintiff for their respective shares of the loss, even though some may have been less
negligent than he.” Id.
49
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 473–74 (explaining the modified forms of comparative
negligence).
50
SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 33. Wisconsin instituted this system when it adopted
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) which states:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any
person or the person’s legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if that
negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
the person recovering. The negligence of the plaintiff shall be
measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be
causally negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% is
limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to
that person.
A person found to be causally negligent whose
percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and
severally liable for the damages allowed.
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equal to or greater than that of the defendant’s, common law
contributory negligence is triggered, and the plaintiff recovers nothing.51
The other form of modified comparative negligence, i.e., the fifty-percent
system, varies only slightly from the former in that it precludes a
plaintiff’s recovery if his fault is equal to or greater than fifty-one
percent.52
Third, some states use a slight-gross system when applying
comparative negligence.53 In order for the plaintiff to recover under this
approach, his negligence must be only slight or minimal, whereas the
defendant’s negligence must be gross by comparison.54 The plaintiff’s
damage award is diminished by his percentage of negligent fault.55
Id. This statute appears to be the first of its kind; as a result, the 50% system is sometimes
referred to as the Wisconsin system of comparative negligence. See SCHWARTZ, supra note
21, at 33.
51
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 474 (describing this system as the “equal fault bar”
that precludes plaintiff recovery if his fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s
fault).
52
SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 34. As a result, this system allows a plaintiff to recover if
his fault is equal to or less than that of the defendants’ fault. Id.
53
Two states that have adopted this approach are Nebraska and South Dakota. See NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 185 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1 et. seq. (2007); see also
Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001); Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d
864 (S.D. 1992). The Nebraska Statute states in part that, “the fact that the plaintiff may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission giving rise to
strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison[] . . . .” NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-21, 185.
54
SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 33.
55
Id. Along with understanding the three types of comparative negligence systems in
the United States, it is also important to note the effects of joint and several liability on
these systems. For instance, under any comparative negligence system, is the plaintiff’s
negligence compared with each individual defendant, or against the aggregate of all of the
defendants’ fault combined? See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 317. A number of states
mandate that the plaintiff’s negligence be compared against the combined negligence of the
joint defendants. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 141.1(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 31-610; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13; OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470. However, states such as Idaho compare the
plaintiff’s negligence to that of each individual defendant. See Odenwalt v. Zaring, 624
P.2d 383, 387 (Idaho 1981); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (2007). In Odenwalt, the
plaintiff’s truck collided with one of the defendant’s cows that was allowed to wander onto
an interstate highway at night, causing injury to the plaintiff. 624 P.2d at 384. The plaintiff
sued the defendant and his association in charge of the cattle for negligence for allowing
the cow to roam. Id. The trial court found the two defendants to be ten percent and sixtyfive percent at fault, respectively, and the plaintiff to be twenty-five percent at fault. Id.
The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff could recover when he was more at fault
than one defendant, but was less at fault than the aggregate of both the defendants’
negligence combined. Id. at 386. The court looked to the State of Wisconsin that had
construed its similar statute to require “individual or one-on-one comparison.” Id. at 387

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 6

270

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

The foregoing innovations for allocating fault have been successful
in reducing the harsh impact that contributory negligence has had on
plaintiffs.56 However, comparative negligence is not without its own
shortcomings, and courts continue to grapple with ever-evolving fact
scenarios.57 It follows, then, that courts are beginning to move beyond
the more progressive forms of contributory negligence founded by
comparative negligence.58
3.

The Rise of Fault Beyond Negligence in Apportioning Liability

Common law contributory negligence was a defense only to acts that
were negligent.59
As states transitioned from contributory to
(applying the holding in Reiter v. Dyken, 290 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1980)). The Idaho court
adopted this approach and held that the plaintiff could not recover against the defendant
who was 10% at fault. Odenwalt, 624 P.2d at 387–88.
Moreover, how joint and several liability is construed will affect the amount of
damages a plaintiff may recover. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 317. For instance, if a
plaintiff’s negligence is compared against each defendant individually, under a fiftypercent system, a thirty-percent-at-fault plaintiff could not recover against three defendants
who were each twenty to twenty-five percent at fault. Id. Conversely, if the plaintiff’s
negligence is compared to the aggregate fault of all of the defendants, the plaintiff may
recover seventy percent of the loss. Id.
56
See, e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984). In Hilen, the plaintiff was severely
injured when the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger crashed and
overturned the vehicle. Id. at 714. The issue at trial was whether the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent by riding in a car with a driver that she knew was intoxicated. Id.
The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of contributory negligence, and the jury
awarded the plaintiff no damages as a result. Id. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that
comparative fault should be adopted by Kentucky. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court
determined that the issue before them was “whether there are principles of fundamental
fairness, underlying the application of contributory negligence as a defense, so compelling
that contributory negligence as a complete defense should be discarded as part of the
common law of this state in favor of comparative negligence.” Id. at 717. After reviewing
many arguments for and against comparative negligence, the court held that
where contributory negligence has previously been a complete
defense, it is supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence. In
such cases contributory negligence will not bar recovery but shall
reduce the total amount of the award in the proportion that the
claimant's contributory negligence bears to the total negligence that
caused the damages.
Id. at 720. As a result, the plaintiff could recover for at least the driver’s percentage of the
fault, rather than receiving no compensation at all. Id.
57
See also infra Part II.B (discussing how courts struggle with the inclusion of intentional
torts in comparative fault systems).
58
See infra Part II.A.3 (chronicling the expansion of comparative negligence to include
other forms of fault).
59
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462. On this, Prosser and Keeton stated as follows:
The ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff is to be set over
against the ordinary negligence of the defendant, to bar the action. But
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comparative negligence, many states maintained that contributory
negligence should be applied exclusively to negligence claims.60 But
some states now expand their comparative schemes by substituting the
word “fault” for “negligence” in their statutes, or by broadly construing
key terms within their laws to allow for other forms of fault outside of
negligence.61
In Bohan v. Ritzo, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
enlarged the reach of its comparative negligence system by adopting a
“comparative causation” approach when evaluating damages under
claims of strict liability.62 The court held that the state’s comparative
fault statute applied to “all tort actions, not merely actions founded in
negligence[]” and, accordingly, that a dog-bite cause of action could be
analyzed under it.63 Even though the court noted that by definition strict

where the defendant’s conduct is actually intended to inflict harm
upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the
kind of fault; and the defense never has been extended to such
intentional torts.
Id. The authors also state that contributory negligence was also not available to cases
involving strict liability. Id. As a result, the two areas of tort law other than negligence—
intentional acts and strict liability—were excluded from the defense of contributory fault.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that the three bases of tort law are
intentional acts, negligence, and strict liability).
60
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2007) (stating that, “[i]n determining by what
amount of the plaintiff’s damages shall be diminished in such a case, the negligence of each
plaintiff shall be compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is
sought”). Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine described Maine’s exclusive
application of comparative fault to negligent conduct by stating that “[c]ontributory
negligence never has been considered a good defense to an intentional tort such as a
battery, and it would likewise appear contrary to sound policy to reduce a plaintiff’s
damages under comparative fault for his ‘negligence’ in encountering the defendant’s
deliberately inflicted harm.” McLain v. Training and Development Corp., 572 A.2d 494, 497
(Me. 1990). The court went on to declare, “[w]e have never recognized contributory or
comparative negligence as a defense to the intentional tort of assault and battery and we
decline to do so now.” Id.
61
For example, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) includes in the meaning of fault
“negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse,
modification, or abuse of product.” See also Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086 (Utah
1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In this case, Justice Stewart stated
that the term, “fault,” was broadened “to apply to comparative principles in products
liability and breach of warranty cases so that defenses such as misuse, abuse of product
modification, etc., were no longer absolute bars to recovery[.]” Id.
62
679 A.2d 597, 601 (N.H. 1996). In this case, as the plaintiff rode his bicycle past the
defendant’s house, the defendant’s dog chased after the plaintiff. Id. at 599. Fearing that
the dog might bite him, the plaintiff stuck out his leg, looked down at the dog, and then
lost control of his bicycle and fell down. Id. The dog never bit the plaintiff. Id.
63
Id. at 601. The text of New Hampshire’s comparative fault statute reads as follows:
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liability and comparative negligence were not compatible because the
former requires no showing of fault, the court decided that the disparity
could be reconciled by looking at the “comparative causation” of the
parties rather than their actual fault.64
In the same vein, New York created its own unique brand of
comparative fault by incorporating language such as “culpable conduct”
into its apportionment scheme.65 The lower appellate court in New York
applied this language in the case of Comeau v. Lucas.66 In Comeau, the
plaintiff sustained a head injury when an intoxicated member of a rock
band, who had been entertaining at a party, intentionally assaulted
him.67 The plaintiff brought a battery claim against the rocker, along

Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff
or plaintiff’s legal representative, to recover damages in tort for death,
personal injury or property damage, if such fault was not greater than
the fault of the defendant, or the defendants in the aggregate if
recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, but the damages
awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault
attributed to the plaintiff by general verdict. The burden of proof as to
the existence or amount of fault attributable to a party shall rest upon
the party making such allegation.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d.
64
Bohan, 679 A.2d at 601. Interestingly, other states also allow negligence and strict
liability to be compared in their comparative fault schemes, even though strict liability
requires no showing of fault. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2). Defining the
common understanding of strict liability, Prosser and Keeton state that
‘[s]trict liability,’. . . as that term is commonly used by modern courts,
means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an
intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal
justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise
reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence. This is often referred to as
liability without fault.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 534.
65
See N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2007). The statute states:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to
property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant or to the decedent, including contributory negligence, or
assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages
otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the
culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the
culpable conduct which caused the damages.
Id.
66
455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
67
Id. In Comeau, a teenage girl hosted a party, where she provided alcohol beverages.
Id. She did this, with her parents’ consent, while her parents were out of the country. Id.
During the party, the plaintiff’s head was seriously injured after a member of the rock band
hired to play at the party intentionally assaulted him. Id. Prior to that event, the plaintiff
had also engaged in disruptive and drunken behavior. Id. Most of the guests at the party
were minors under the age of eighteen. Id.
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with negligence actions against the hostess of the party and her parents,
for failure to properly supervise the event.68
On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court’s jury award for the
battery claim and awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages and
$30,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiff.69 However, the court
reduced the amount by ten percent due to the plaintiff’s own “culpable
conduct” by drinking and engaging in disruptive behavior.70 The
appellate court then reinstated the negligence claims against the hostess
and her parents that had been dismissed by the trial court, and
remanded those issues for determination.71 In the end, the court applied
New York’s “culpable conduct” statute to compare every party’s fault,
regardless of the type of tort committed.72
States like New Hampshire and New York set the stage for others to
rethink their own approaches to comparative fault.73 Some states began
to apply comparative principles to actions formerly excluded from fault

Id. Specifically, the plaintiff’s allegations were that because the hostess’s parents gave
their consent to the event and knew that minors would be present and drinking alcohol
and that a rock band had been hired, they failed to properly supervise the party given by
their 16 year-old daughter, even though they were out of the country at the time of the
party. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed the hostess was individually liable as the
agent of her parents for failing to properly supervise the party in the absence of her
parents. Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case against the
parents of the hostess for failure to supervise because of their consent to the party. Id. at
675. Furthermore, the court said that the hostess was the agent of the parents because the
parents expressly placed their daughter in control of the premises, authorized the party,
and gave their daughter instructions to be followed. Id.
72
Id. But see New York v. Corwen, 565 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that
intentional torts could not be included in a civil action to recover bribes paid to city officials
who had been convicted of racketeering). In Corwen, the city of New York brought an
action to recover bribes paid to city officials. Id. Discussing the issue of allocating fault and
including intentional torts, the court reasoned:
The defendants-appellants also contend that the IAS Court erroneously
barred the city's claimed negligence as a defense to the intentional tort
causes of action. While the Corwen defendants did not explicitly
assert comparative negligence as a defense, they did assert negligence
as a recoupment and setoff and the IAS court correctly regarded that as
identical to asserting a comparative negligence defense. In the past,
contributory negligence clearly has not been regarded as a defense to
intentional torts and that appears to remain the rule with respect to
comparative negligence.
Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted). As a result, in this opinion, the court did not allow
comparisons between intentional and negligent fault. Id.
73
See infra Part II.B (discussing the approaches of different states regarding the inclusion
of intentional torts).
68
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allocation, such as breach of warranty or products liability.74 But the
most controversial expansion of comparative fault has been when it is
applied to torts that are intentional in nature.75
B. The Fifty States and the Inclusion of Intentional Torts into Comparative
Fault
In the wake of many states broadening the reach of comparative
fault, some states now struggle with the question of whether to allow
comparisons between negligent acts and intentional acts.76 Presently, the
majority of states does not permit such comparisons.77 But an emerging
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (stating that “fault” includes negligence,
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty, products liability,
and misuse, modification, and abuse of a product). Discussing this statute, Justice Stewart
of the Utah Supreme Court determined that the Utah legislature “broadened the statute to
apply comparative principles in products liability and breach of warranty cases so that
defenses such as misuse, abuse of product modification, etc., were no longer absolute bars
to recovery but operated only to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery, as in negligence cases.” Field
v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
75
See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the states that include intentional torts when
comparing fault).
76
See, e.g., Field v. Boyer, 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998); see also Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128
P.3d 1146 (Utah 2005). Also, the term “comparison” in this context refers to the concept of
a court grouping the fault of all contributors to an injury together, then comparing each to
decide what percentage was caused by whom, and then dividing up the damages between
the culpable parties according to those percentages. And, as this Note will discuss, issues
arise when the acts of defendants who committed intentional torts are allowed to be
compared to the acts of negligent defendants under traditional comparative fault allocation
systems. See infra Part III (analyzing the issue as it now stands before the states).
77
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (2007); see also Kellerman v. Zeno, 983 S.W.2d 136
(Ark. 1998). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2007); see also Heiner v. Kmart Corp., 84
Cal.App. 4th 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 2007);
see also Bhinder v. Sun Co., 819 A.2d 822 (Conn. 2003). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8132
(2007); see also Rochester v. Katalan, 320 A.2d 704 (Del. 1974). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81
(West 2007); see also Vantran Indus., Inc., 890 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). See Gates
v. Navy, 617 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). See Poole v. Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768
(Ill. 1995). See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 et seq. (West 2007); see also Hansen v. Anderson,
Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 2001). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a
(2007); see also Sieben v. Sieben, 646 P.2d 1036 (Kan. 1982). See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 156 (2007); see also McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494 (Me. 1990). See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2007); see also Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d
1068 (Mass. 1993). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(West 2007); see also Florenzano v. Olson,
387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986). See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 85-5-7 (2007); Dawson v. Townsend
& Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). See MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.765 (West
2007); see also Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983). See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1702 (2007); see also Martel v. Power Co., 752 P.2d 140, 143 (Mont. 1988) (holding that all
forms of conduct can be compared that fall short of intentional acts to cause injury or
damage). See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 185 (West 2007); see also Brandon v. County of
Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001). See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141; see also Davies v.
74
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minority of states includes intentional torts either by statute,78 judicial
interpretation, or decree.79 Still, other states have yet to resolve this issue
within their jurisdictions.80
Part II.B discusses how each state
approaches this issue.81
Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979). See Coleman v. Hines, 515 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West 2007); see also Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990). See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 6 (West 2007); see also Parret v. Unicco
Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005). See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.600, et seq. (West 2007);
see also Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). See
Johnson v. Phila., 808 A.2d 978 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (2007);
see also Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Assoc., Inc., 773 A.2d 834 (2001). See S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-9-1 et. seq. (2007); see also Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864 (S.D. 1992). See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (2007); see also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991), modified, Tony Gullo Motors I v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006).
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2007). See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 2007);
see also Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 75 P.3d 497 (Wash. 2003). See
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). See WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West 2007); see also Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 384
N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1986).
78
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.900 (2007) (including intentional torts in the definition
of fault); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803 (2007) (allowing negligence and comparative
responsibility to be compared); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-6-2-45 (West 2007) (including willful,
wanton, reckless, and intentional acts under the definition of fault); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 600.6304 (West 2007) (including intentional misconduct within the definition of
fault); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1411 (designating comparisons between “culpable conduct”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03. 2-02 (2007) (including in the definition of fault, “willful conduct”); see
also Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D. 2002) (interpreting the language of the
statute to include intentional acts).
79
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (2007); see also Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d
449 (Ariz. 1998). See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 2007); see also Toothman v.
Freeborn & Peters, 80 P.3d 804, 815-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing intentional and
negligent torts to be compared between joint defendants, but not between the plaintiff and
defendants). See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (2007); see also Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment
Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds,
954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998). See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 2007); see also Roman
Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2007); see also Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So. 2d 943, 954 (La. 2003)
(holding that intentional and negligent torts will be compared between the plaintiff and
defendants only when the plaintiff is negligent, but not when the plaintiff’s conduct was
intentional). See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (2007); see also Bohan, 679 A.2d at 601
(stating that courts should look to “comparative causation” when allocating damages). See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1-5.2 (West 2007); see also Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 23132 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the fault of a negligent plaintiff and an intentional tortfeasing
defendant can be compared). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (West 2007); see also Garcia v.
Gordon, 98 P.3d 1044 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-102 (2007); see
also Limbaugh, 59 S.W.2d at 87. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (2007); see also Bd. Of County
Comm’rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079 (Wyo. 2000).
80
See Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1146, 1151 (Utah 2005) (concluding that Utah has
not resolved this issue, and the legislature may do so if it chooses). Alabama, Maryland,
South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia continue to employ common law
contributory negligence. See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980); Harrison
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States That Do Not Include Intentional Torts in Their Comparative
Fault Systems

The primary reason that a majority of states does not allow
intentional torts within the reach of their comparative fault systems is
that common law contributory negligence did not bar a plaintiff’s
recovery if the harm caused was the result of intentional misconduct.82
Other states are less concerned about the common law heritage of the
principle than they are about the literal definitional differences between
intentional acts and torts more akin to negligence.83 The Oregon Court
of Appeals has gone so far as to characterize intentional-negligent
evaluations as “conceptually incoherent[.]”84 Many courts insist that
v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983); Langley v. Boyter, 332
S.E.2d 100, 101 (S.C. 1985); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 303 S.E.2d 868, 872 (Va.
1983); Sanai v. Polinger Co., 498 A.2d 520, 524 (D.C. 1985).
81
See infra Parts II.B.1–4 (discussing the different approaches throughout United States
jurisdictions).
82
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462; see also McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp.,
572 A.2d 494, 497 (Me. 1990) (stating that, in Maine “[c]ontributory negligence never has
been considered a good defense to an intentional tort such as a battery, and it would
likewise appear contrary to sound policy to reduce a plaintiff’s damages under
comparative fault for his ‘negligence’ in encountering the defendant’s deliberately inflicted
harm.”). Also, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated, “[b]efore the adoption of
comparative fault, contributory negligence was not a defense to willful or intentional
misconduct.” Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
83
See Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ohio 1990) (stating that, “[n]egligence is
synonymous with heedlessness, carelessness, thoughtlessness, disregard, inattention,
inadvertence, remissness, and oversight. Willfulness implies design, set purpose, intention,
[and] deliberation[]”). The court concluded that a willful actor is “conscious of his conduct,
and conscious, from his knowledge of existing conditions, that injury would likely or
probably result from his conduct, and that with reckless indifference to consequences[,] he
consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which
produced the injurious result.” Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated
that, “[i]ntent. . .is broader than a desire to bring about physical results. It must extend not
only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are
substantially certain to follow from what he does.” Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572,
577 (Okla. 2005). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island took the literal meaning
of the statute and stated that, “[o]ur comparative negligence statute . . . is not a
comparative fault statute. It comes into play only after negligence is first established on the
part of both the plaintiff and the defendant.” Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Assoc., Inc.,
773 A.2d 834, 837 (2001).
84
Shin, 111 P.3d at 776. The Oregon court qualified this characterization by stating that
negligence exists on a continuum of fault that begins with simple negligence and ends with
gross negligence and recklessness. Id. Willful and intentional misconduct, however, is not
on that continuum. Id. Describing the nature of intentional acts, the court determined,
“[they do] not involve a mere neglect of responsibility, however serious; to the contrary,
[they] involve[] a conscious decision to act in a way that risks harm to another.” Id. As a
result, the court held that intentional misconduct and negligence were “qualitatively
different” and are “not comparable.” Id.
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intentional acts and negligent conduct are not just different by degree,
but they are absolutely different in the type of fault each embodies.85
Some states choose to not include intentional torts when comparing
fault because of public policy.86 For example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court would not allow an insurance agent’s liability for intentional
misrepresentations to be compared to any negligence on the part of the
plaintiff because “where society wants certain conduct absolutely
prohibited and discouraged, apportionment of fault is not
appropriate.”87 The Nevada Supreme Court declared that intentional
tortfeasors should not be able to reap the benefits of comparative fault by
shifting any portion of their culpability to other parties.88 It has also been
See, e.g., Parret, 127 P.3d at 576. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that
ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree, yet negligence and willful and wanton
conduct differ in kind. Id. As a result, Oklahoma refused to expand its comparative fault
to include willful and wanton or intentional misconduct. Id. See also KEETON ET AL, supra
note 18, at 462 (stating that, “where the defendant’s conduct is actually intended to inflict
harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault;
and the defense [of contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional
torts.”). Interestingly, however, the Illinois Supreme Court differently characterized the
disparity between intentional and negligent misconduct when it stated, “because of the
‘qualitative difference’ between simple negligence and willful and wanton misconduct a
plaintiff’s negligence . . . [can]not be compared with a defendant’s willful and wanton
misconduct.” Poole, 656 N.E.2d at 770 (emphasis added). But see Gail D. Hollister, Using
Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Tort Suits in
Which Both the Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 138–41 (1993)
(arguing that the distinction between intentional and negligent torts is often vague and
varies only in degree, not in kind).
86
See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (describing the holdings and reasoning of
courts that adhere to this approach).
87
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 175–176 (Minn. 1986). The court continued by
stating that it is “bad [public] policy to permit an intentional tortfeasor the defense of
comparative negligence merely because he or she chooses a gullible or foolish victim.” Id.
at 176. See Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 827 (Iowa
2001). In Hansen, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated that, “shifting the full responsibility for
the loss to the intentional tortfeasor serves the policy of deterring conduct which society
considers to be substantially more egregious than negligence.” Id. But see William
Westerbeke, The Application of Comparative Responsibility to Intentional Tortfeasors and Immune
Parties, 10-FALL KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 190 (2000) (discussing how not all intentional
torts rise to the “high culpability” level that society is so bent on prohibiting).
88
Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979). In Davies, the parents of a young man
brought a wrongful death action against a social drinking club when their son died of
alcoholic poisoning during his initiation to the club. Id. at 606–07. The respondent
drinking club on appeal argued that the decedent was contributorily negligent in that he
consented to the initiation process. Id. at 610. However, the Nevada court disagreed and
said that intentional wrongdoers “should not have the benefit of contributory
negligence[.]” Id. at 611. See Lee A. Wright, Utah’s Comparative Apportionment: What
Happened to the Comparison?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 561 (1998) (describing how including
intentional torts leads to under-accountability); see also Christopher M. Brown & Kirk A.
Morgan, Consideration of Intentional Torts in Fault Allocation: Disarming the Duty to Protect
85
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argued that apportionment of fault between intentional and negligent
actors diminishes the deterrent elements designed to prevent intentional
misconduct.89 But whatever the rationale, the majority of states
continues to keep intentional torts separate from negligence when
allocating fault.90

Against Intentional Misconduct, 2 WYO. L. REV. 483, 511–12 (2002) (discussing that the duty to
prevent harm will be diminished by including intentional torts).
89
See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991) (rejecting this argument because
a plaintiff’s comparative fault will reduce only the recovery of compensatory damages, not
the recovery of punitive damages).
90
See supra note 77 (listing the authority for states that do not include intentional torts
when comparing fault). The effect of not including intentional torts in comparative fault is
illustrated in the decision of Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001).
In Brandon, the decedent had been sexually abused as a child and, as a result, developed a
gender-identity disorder. Id. In 1993, she came to Richardson County and held herself out
to the public as a man. Id. The decedent met a young woman, who believed the decedent
was a man, and they dated for approximately one month. Id. However, the decedent’s
true gender fell under suspicion when she went to jail on charges of forgery and the county
placed her in the female area. Id. Subsequently, in an attempt to verify their suspicions,
two male friends of the decedent and her girlfriend forcibly removed the decedent’s pants
and then drove her to a remote location where they brutally beat and raped her. Id. After
the decedent had been raped and beaten, she managed to escape through a bathroom
window to report the event to the sheriff’s department. Id. at 611. However, the sheriff
who took her interview demeaned and belittled the decedent, by referring to her as an “it”
and crudely and insensitively questioning her about her gender-identity crisis and the rape.
Id. at 611–13. Furthermore, no arrests were made, even after questioning the two men and
knowing that each had significant criminal records and had made threats on the decedent’s
life if she revealed the incident. Id. at 614. Within the week, however, the two men
murdered the decedent, along with two other people, in a rural farmhouse. Id. at 610. The
trial court awarded the plaintiff, who was the mother of the decedent, $6,223.20 in
economic damages and $80,000 in noneconomic damages. Id. at 618. However, because
the court found the victim to be one percent at fault and the intentional tortfeasors to be
eighty-five percent at fault, it reduced the plaintiff’s award against the county by those
percentages. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the trial court’s
decision and held that the allocation of damages under the state’s comparative negligence
scheme applied only to negligent tortfeasors and not to those who acted intentionally. Id.
at 619. The Nebraska Supreme Court invoked two common reasons for their holding. Id.
at 619–20. First, the court determined that the state’s comparative negligence law only
applied to civil actions in which contributory negligence was a defense, and because at
common law contributory negligence was not a defense to intentional torts, the court
would likewise not allow comparative negligence to be a defense to an intentional tort. Id.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that when a defendant intends to inflict harm, “there is a
difference, not merely in degree, but in the kind of fault[.]” Id. at 619. Second, the court
determined that the plain language of the statute specified the word “negligence” as the
kind of tort that is appropriate for comparative fault; thus, intentional torts could not be
included. Id. at 620. As a result, the court mandated that the plaintiff’s award not be
reduced by the eighty-five percent of fault attributable to the two men who raped and
murdered her daughter and that the county be liable for the entire amount. Id. at 628.
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States That Include Intentional Torts When Comparing Fault

Despite the trend to not allow intentional torts into comparative fault
analysis, an increasing minority of states is now expanding their faultallocating systems to include intentional wrongdoing.91 A few states
have included intentional acts by statute and have applied the principles
in varying situations.92 Other states have incorporated intentional
misconduct by judicial interpretation or decree.93 For instance, the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld a jury determination in a civil case that
found the city of Phoenix to be seventy-five percent at fault for the
murder of the plaintiffs’ children, whereas the murderer was held to be
only twenty-five percent at fault.94 The court reasoned that it could find
no compelling authority requiring that intentional acts be weighed more
heavily than those that are negligent.95
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (listing authority for states that have
adopted comparative fault systems that include intentional torts).
92
See supra notes 77–80 (listing all the statutes in the various states); see also Hansen v.
Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 2002) (allocating fault between the murderer of the plaintiffs’
mother and the Department of Criminal Justice for failing to fully disclose a parolee’s
criminal background and for failing to adequately supervise the parolee); Joseph v. Alaska,
26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001) (holding that in the case of an inmate committing suicide,
because the jail was in a custodial relationship, the intentional act of suicide could not bar
the plaintiff from recovering under negligence, even if such negligence was not
foreseeable); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074 (Idaho 2000) (allowing
comparisons between the fault of a defendant who caused injury to the plaintiff when he
intentionally and jokingly pulled a chair out from under the plaintiff); Coffman v.
Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing comparisons, where a real estate
agent intentionally did not disclose that the plaintiff would have to assume costs associated
with access road construction); Lamp v. Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)
(allowing defendant’s intentional misconduct to be compared when a motor-cross racer hit
a concealed tree stump on the perimeter of a racetrack and sustained injuries resulting from
the accident); Comeau v. Lucas, 90 A.D.2d 674, 674–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
93
See supra note 79 (listing the jurisdictions that adopted this approach through judicial
decree).
94
Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453 (Ariz. 1998). In Hutcherson, the City of
Phoenix received a telephone call from a young woman worried about being assaulted by
her former boyfriend. Id. at 450. After hearing the woman explain that her ex-boyfriend
had been pursuing her all night and threatened her, the 911 Operator twice said that she
would send an officer as soon as she could. Id. Twenty-two minutes after the 911 phone
call, the ex-boyfriend entered the house where the woman was hiding and fatally shot her
and her current boyfriend before turning the gun on himself. Id. at 450–51. The mothers of
the victims brought a wrongful death action against the city because the operator had
categorized the emergency call as Priority 3, the average response time of which is 32.6
minutes. Id. at 451.
95
Id. at 452–53. The court also quoted the dissenting opinion from the lower appellate
court on this same matter that stated:
The murderer’s culpability is enormous, the operator’s is slight. He
committed deliberate homicide; she misjudged the severity of the call.
91
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States that have adopted this approach have not done so uniformly.96
Colorado permits the inclusion of intentional torts between joint
defendants, but does not permit it when comparing the fault of a
plaintiff to that of a defendant.97 Louisiana, on the other hand, allows a
plaintiff’s fault to be compared to a defendant’s intentional act, but only
when the plaintiff also acted intentionally.98 Furthermore, Tennessee has
a limited approach of applying comparative fault to intentional torts that
applies only between defendants and only when both are named parties
to the lawsuit.99 Tennessee requires this to prevent what is known as the
“empty chair” defense.100
And when it comes to contribution to causation, at first blush, the
imbalance again weighs heavily toward the murderer. When you add
relative timing into the picture, however, the balance starts to shift.
The operator has notice of a potentially imminent harm and a chance
to avoid it. This is a proper factor for the fact finder to weigh. It is also
proper for the fact finder to weigh the operator’s responsibility for
foresight and avoidance. It enters into the weighing of relative degrees
of fault.
Id. at 453 (quoting Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 933 P.2d 1251, 1265–66 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (Grant, J., dissenting)).
96
See supra notes 78–79 (listing authority for states that have adopted comparative fault
systems that include intentional torts).
97
See Toothman v. Freeborn & Peters, 80 P.3d 804, 815–16 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). In
Toothman, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants intentionally defrauded investors by
organizing, promoting, and selling interests in fifty-three limited liability partnerships. Id.
at 807. In deciding that the fault of the intentionally tortfeasing defendants could not be
reduced by the plaintiff’s negligence, the court determined that
the [Colorado] supreme court has ruled that the pro rata statute
requires apportionment of damages among the several defendants
even when one of the tortfeasors commits an intentional tort that
contributes to an indivisible injury. However, we disagree . . . [that
this] mandate[s] apportionment among plaintiffs when the underlying
action alleges intentional . . . conduct by the defendants.
Id. at 815–16 (citation omitted).
98
Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So. 2d 943, 953–54 (La. 2003). The Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that that a negligent plaintiff who is injured by the fault of an intentional
tortfeasor will not have his damages reduced by his percentage of the fault. Id. at 953.
However, this “applies only when plaintiff’s contributory fault consists of negligence and
does not apply where the plaintiff’s fault is intentional.” Id. at 954.
99
See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 86–87 (Tenn. 2001). But see Ozaki v.
Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in
part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998) (using Hawaii’s pure form of
comparative negligence broadly to apportion fault between a defendant’s intentional
murder, the negligence of another defendant, and the victim of the murder). In Ozaki, the
jury found the murderer to be ninety-two percent at fault, the owner of the apartment
complex where the murder took place to be three percent at fault, and the victim to be five
percent at fault. Id. at 657. On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the allocation,
reasoning that every person who had any contributory fault should be included because
such would “accomplish a fairer and more equitable result” and “fairness and equity are
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But the most groundbreaking expansion of comparative fault to
include intentional torts comes from the Supreme Court of New Jersey.101
In Blazovic v. Andrich, a group of men assaulted and injured the plaintiff
outside of a bar after the plaintiff verbally tried to stop them from
throwing rocks at a nearby sign.102 The jury at trial found that the owner
of the bar where the assault took place, the intentional assaulters, and the
plaintiff all contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.103 The trial court
nevertheless instructed the jury to compare only the relative fault of the
plaintiff and the bar owner because it understood the comparative fault
law to exclude intentional actors.104
On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed, and the fault of
the intentionally tortfeasing defendants was included in the allocation of
liability.105 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it did not
more important than conceptual and semantic consistency[.]” Id. at 660 (citing Kaneko v.
Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Haw. 1982)). See also Garcia, 98 P.3d at 1047
(explaining that, “[p]ure comparative negligence denies recovery for one’s own fault; it
permits recovery to the extent of another’s fault; and it holds all parties fully responsible
for their own respective acts to the degree that those acts have caused harm.”).
100
Compare Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 86–87 with Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D.
2002) (stating that the North Dakota’s comparative negligence statute “contemplates an
‘empty chair’ defense, which specifically permits an allocation of fault to each person who
contributed to an injury even though that person may not be a party to the action[]”). Id.
See E-mail from Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at the Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer in Salt Lake
City, Utah, to Senator Ross I. Romero, Utah Legislator (February 5, 2007, 5:58 p.m. MST)
(on file with author) (commenting on this “empty chair” defense, and stating that this
defense leads to the victim being victimized twice).
101
See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991).
102
Id. at 224. The facts of the case are that while in the parking lot of a bar the plaintiff
asked a group of men to stop throwing rocks at a nearby sign. Id. However, this fact was
in dispute because the defendants claimed that the plaintiff repeatedly swore at them. Id.
Nevertheless, both sides agreed that a member of the group of men began a physical
confrontation that resulted in the plaintiff being pushed to the ground and significantly
beaten. Id.
103
Id. Specifically, the fault attributed by the jury to each party was that the intentional
tortfeasors assaulted the plaintiff, the bar failed to provide adequate lighting and security
in the parking lot, and the plaintiff provoked the assault. Id. at 233.
104
Id. at 224.
105
Id. at 225, 233. The procedural posture in this case is that the lower appellate court
reversed the trial court, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the lower appellate court on
this specific issue. Id. Discussing the reasoning behind the holding in Blazovic and other
cases that have relied on Blazovic, Theresa L. Fiset stated that the opinions were based on
the premise that comparative fault was developed “to achieve a fairer distribution of loss in
negligence actions by equating liability with fault.” Theresa L. Fiset, Comparative Fault As a
Tool to Nullify the Duty to Protect: Apportioning Liability to a Non-party Intentional Tortfeasor in
Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 27 STETSON L. REV. 699, 713 (1997). As a result, the courts
in these decisions determined that the legislatures intended all tortious conduct to be
included under comparative fault; therefore, “a jury must apportion liability for damages
among intentional and negligent tortfeasors because they are all at ‘fault[.]’” Id. at 713–14.
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view intentional wrongdoing as different-in-kind from negligence, but
merely different-in-degree.106 The court further reasoned that because
the plaintiff’s comparative fault would reduce only his recovery of
compensatory damages, the punitive damage award would remain
intact to provide the necessary deterrent for intentional wrongdoing.107
In short, the court expressed the view that fairness required a
proportionate allocation of fault to all culpable parties.108
Blazovic is significant because it illustrates the situation contemplated
in the hypothetical above where a defendant commits an intentionally
violent act and reduces his liability by the negligence of the plaintiff that
he injured.109
Describing this issue further, Professor William
Westerbeke stated, “Reduction of my obligation to pay damages in
proportion to your contributory negligence may be appropriate if I am
merely negligent in running my car into your car. The reduction is far
less appropriate if I intentionally crash into your car.”110 Therefore, the
106
Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991). The court further explained that
acting intentionally “involves knowingly or purposefully engaging in conduct
‘substantially certain’ to result in injury to another.” Id. On the other hand, “wanton and
willful conduct” differs in that it “poses a highly unreasonable risk of harm likely to result
in injury.” Id. Nevertheless, the court decided that even those differences between
intentional conduct and negligence did not preclude comparisons by a jury. Id. The court
reasoned that the jury will reflect the different levels of culpability inherent in the different
types of conduct. Id. The court also reasoned that by including intentional torts, “we
adhere most closely to the guiding principle of comparative fault—to distribute the loss in
proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.” Id.
107
Id. at 231–32. The court explained that the design of punitive damages is “to punish
the wrongdoer, and not to compensate the injured party[.]” Id. at 232. As a result, punitive
damages are not subject to apportionment or contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id.
108
Id. at 233. See also Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d
652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998)
(stating that including intentional torts when comparing fault accomplishes fairer and
more equitable results). In Ozaki, the decedent was murdered by her boyfriend in her
apartment. Id. at 655. Before the murder, the boyfriend came to the complex and asked the
security guard to let him in to wait for the decedent. Id. The security guard allowed the
boyfriend to enter, and the next day the decedent was found dead in her apartment due to
either suffocation or strangulation. Id. The plaintiff, who was the decedent’s executor of
the estate, and the decedent’s sister brought multiple claims including seeking damages for
physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, future earnings, and loss of pleasure of
being alive. Id. at 655–56. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the fault of both the
boyfriend and the apartment complex could be apportioned under comparative fault. Id. at
662. The court reasoned that, “where a defendant’s intentional conduct, a co-defendant’s
negligence, and the plaintiff’s negligence combine to cause the plaintiff’s damages, ‘pure
comparative negligence principles’ should be applied and the plaintiff’s recovery should
reflect the relative degrees of fault of all culpable parties as determined by the jury.” Id.
109
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (offering the hypothetical situation of a
rapist reducing his civil liability by the negligence of the plaintiff).
110
Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190. But Professor Westerbeke goes on to say that
“[b]ecause contributory negligence rarely arises as a serious defense to an intentional tort,
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decision in Blazovic may seem radical to those states that characterize the
comparison of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a defendant acting
intentionally as an absurdity.111
3.

States That Are Undecided as to Whether to Include Intentional
Torts in Their Comparative Fault Systems

Although few in number, there are a handful of states that have yet
to clearly decide whether to include intentional torts in their comparative
fault schemes.112 Utah, in particular, has unsuccessfully tried to resolve
this issue in a recent series of state supreme court cases.113 First, in Field
v. Boyer Co., the Utah Supreme Court discussed whether it should
include the fault of an unknown sexual assailant who raped the plaintiff
on the property of a store owned by the defendant.114 Upon reviewing
the language of the statute that defines the word “fault,” the plurality of
the court decided that “fault” included intentional conduct.115 The court
comparative fault reductions would probably be infrequent and small[.]” Id. Westerbeke
explains in his discourse that his view is that including intentional torts in comparative
fault creates judicial economy and administrative efficiency. Id. He argues that most states
extend comparative fault to reckless acts, and that such acts require some form of intent.
Id. Therefore, he states that, “Little if any public policy gains will result from burdening
courts and attorneys with the need to try these tort actions under both ‘all or nothing’ and
comparative responsibility principles until the trier of fact decides whether defendant’s
conduct was intentional or merely reckless.” Id. at 190–91.
111
See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Furthermore, Ellen M. Bublick describes that some areas of the law
could be dramatically impacted by allowing intentional tortfeasors to reduce their liability
by the plaintiff’s negligence. See Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative
Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 435 (2003). In her article,
Bublick stated that comparing a defendant’s intentional and negligent fault reduces the
intentional tortfeasor’s liability to the plaintiff. Id. However, she suggests that allowing
these comparisons may seem unimportant because many intentional tortfeasors will be
absent or insolvent. Id. Nevertheless, Bublick states that there are large categories of cases
in which comparing the fault of the defendant and plaintiff when intentional torts are
involved will have a significant financial impact, such as intentional environmental harm.
Id.
112
See supra note 80 (listing states that are undecided on this issue).
113
See Field, 952 P.2d at 1078–90; Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1146, 1146–51 (Utah
2005).
114
Field, 952 P.2d at 1079. In this case, the plaintiff was an employee of a department
store located in the plaza owned by the defendants. Id. On a particular night, the plaintiff
left work and walked to her car in the parking lot outside the store. Id. As she passed a set
of stairs, someone assaulted her from behind by wrapping a rope around her neck, choking
her to unconsciousness, and then physically and sexually assaulting her. Id. The plaintiff
sued the store and the owners of the plaza for failing to provide adequate security for
employees and customers. Id. The defendants moved to include the fault of the plaintiff’s
unknown assailant into the jury’s apportionment of fault. Id.
115
Id. at 1080. UTAH CODE § 78-27-37(2) states that “Fault” under the statute means:
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reasoned that intentional acts could be compared because the statute
contemplated any act proximately causing or contributing to the injury
or damage.116
After the Field decision, many believed that the court had decided
the issue in favor of allowing intentional torts into Utah’s comparative
fault scheme.117 However, in 2005 the Utah Supreme Court declared
unequivocally that “the solution to the riddle of Field is that whether the
. . . [Utah comparative fault statute] applies to intentional torts remains
an open question. . . .” and that “the legislature may, if it elects, answer

any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately
causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person
seeking recovery, including negligence in all [of] its degrees,
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
Id.
116
Field, 952 P.2d at 1080. The court continued, “[c]learly an intentional tort such as
battery is an act that proximately causes or contributes to injury or damage. Thus, we
conclude that the legislature included intentional acts in its comparative fault scheme.” Id.
However, Justice Stewart wrote a scathing dissent discussing the injustice created by
permitting an intentional actor to reduce his liability by a plaintiff’s negligence:
The legal obligation not to assault or rape is absolute. The law does
not impose on a victim a duty to avoid a criminal act by another. How
can . . . [the] lead opinion countenance the proposition that a rapist’s
liability can be reduced because the victim imprudently let the rapist
into her home after a date? How can the lead opinion countenance the
proposition that a murderer’s liability in a wrongful death action can
be reduced because a landlord failed to repair an apartment building’s
locks? If, as must surely be law, the rapist who assaulted [the plaintiff]
should not be allowed to reduce his liability by the . . . defendants’
negligence, it is not logically possible to permit the…defendants to
reduce their liability by offsetting the assailant’s criminal, intentional
fault against their negligence[.]
Id. at 1088. Furthermore, Justice Stewart articulated the inherent unfairness to the plaintiff
created by allowing a comparison of intentional fault in this case when he stated that
[g]iven defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all. Such an
application of comparative principles would eviscerate defendants’
duty to prevent such a wrong.
Id.
117
See Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1149, 1148 (Utah 2005) (stating that many people,
other than the members of the Utah Supreme Court, believed that the issue was resolved in
the Field opinion).
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it.”118 Despite a number of proposed bills, the state legislature has yet to
resolve this issue for Utah.119
C. Attempts at Uniformity: the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the
Restatement
States that are undecided or wish to change their methodology may
look to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act or the Restatement of Torts
for guidance in deciding whether to include intentional torts when
comparing fault.120 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is clear, stating,
“[t]he Act does not include intentional torts.”121 Comparatively, the
Restatement is less exclusive in its approach.122
Recognizing the many issues inherent in including intentional torts
in comparative fault, the Restatement deals cautiously with this issue.123
118
Id. at 1151. In Jedrziewski, one evening thirty students from a local high school went to
the home of the plaintiff looking for students of a rival high school in hopes of retaliating
for a series of previous altercations between the two groups. Id. at 1147. After breaking
several windows on the plaintiff’s house and chasing a number of students, the group
caught up with the plaintiff and brutally beat him with baseball bats. Id. At the time the
group caught up with the plaintiff, the plaintiff was involved in an altercation with a
member of the group who had previously hit the plaintiff’s female friend in the face. Id.
119
See H.R. 45, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (proposing the inclusion of intentional
torts into Utah’s comparative fault scheme). Nevertheless, this Bill did not pass and its
sponsor has since left the legislature.
120
See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1.
121
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, cmt. a (1977). The Act defines “fault” as:
[A]cts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of
warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an
enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the
defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to
avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal
relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory
fault.
Id. at § 1(b).
122
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c.; see also
Ellen M. Bublick, supra note 111, at 435 (describing the restatement as it applies to
intentional torts in comparative fault).
123
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c. The
comment to §1 articulates very well the issues that are created by including intentional
torts in comparison schemes:
Whether intentional torts should be included raises two principal
issues as well as some subordinate ones. First, should a plaintiff’s
negligence reduce the plaintiff’s recovery against an intentional
tortfeasor? Second, when one of two or more defendants is liable for
an intentional tort, should a percentage of responsibility be assigned to
that tortfeasor? Such an allocation could affect: (a) the plaintiff’s own
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For instance, it specifically states that it takes no position on whether to
allow comparisons between a negligent plaintiff and a defendant who
commits an intentional tort.124 But if the plaintiff also commits an
intentional act, his fault may be compared to that of other intentional
actors.125 Furthermore, the Restatement allows the fault of a negligent
defendant to be compared with that of an intentional actor only when
the former breached a special duty to protect the plaintiff from the injury
caused by the intentional act.126 This concept is known as the “very
duty” rule.127
Therefore, even though the Restatement includes
intentional torts when comparing fault, it suggests a limited approach.128
D. Public Policy Bases of Tort Law
When analyzing any issue founded in tort law, it is crucial to
recognize that this legal area has been shaped by “the pursuit of a variety
percentage of responsibility and thereby reduce the plaintiff’s recovery
against other defendants, including nonintentional tortfeasors, (b)
whether to impose joint and several liability on various defendants, (c)
the allocation of responsibility to other defendants, (d) whether a
different defendant should bear liability for responsibility assigned to
the intentional tortfeasor, (e) the rules governing settlement, and (f)
contribution and indemnity.
Id.
Id. The Restatement states that “[a]lthough some courts have held that a plaintiff’s
negligence may serve as a comparative defense to an intentional tort, most have not. This
Restatement takes no position on that issue.” Id.
125
Id.
126
See id. § 14; see also id. § 12 (stating that intentional tortfeasors are jointly and severally
liable, even if joint and several liability has been abolished in a particular jurisdiction).
127
See Bublick, supra note 111, at 423. Describing this rule, Bublick states that “a
negligent tortfeasor cannot reduce its liability to the plaintiff if it is liable for a ‘failure to
protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of the intentional tort.’” Id. (quoting the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14). The very-duty rule is
described well in the case of Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing, Corp., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).
In this case, the plaintiff lost his fingers after his hand was crushed by a push-press at
work. Id. at 282. In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the following:
The asserted negligence of plaintiff—placing his hand under the ram
while at the same time depressing the foot pedal—was the very
eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against. It
would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety
devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for the very
injury the duty was meant to protect against. We hold that under the
facts presented to us in this case the defense of contributory negligence
is unavailable.
Id. at 286 (citations omitted). Therefore, because the defendant’s duty was to manfacture
this device to prevent the specific harm that the plaintiff suffered, the court denied the use
of the defense of contributory negligence. Id.
128
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c.
124
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of ends[.]”129 One goal already mentioned is the need to provide relief to
injured plaintiffs.130 But other aims that tort law seeks to accomplish
must also be considered in deciding whether intentional torts should be
included in comparative fault analysis. Vincent Johnson and Alan Gunn
provide the following list of additional policy goals:131
1. “Liability should be based on fault.”132
2. “Liability should be proportional to fault.”133
3. “Liability should be used to deter accidents.”134
4. “The costs of accidents should be spread broadly.”135
5. “The costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to
bear them.”136
6. “Tort law should foster predictability in human affairs.”137

VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4 (Carolina
Academic Press 1994). The authors continue by explaining that the many goals of tort law
are “sometimes-congruent, sometimes-conflicting public policies.” Id. But understanding
them helps to explain the rules of law and to evaluate “tort standards by clarifying the
interests advanced or sacrificed through adherence to a given position.” Id.
130
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing the priority of plaintiff
recovery in the American tort law system).
131
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 4–7. Not discussed in this Note are four other
policy goals also provided by Johnson and Gunn: “Those who benefit from dangerous
activities should bear the resulting losses[;]” “Tort law should facilitate economic growth
and the pursuit of progress[;]” “Tort law should discourage the waste of resources[;]” and
“Courts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of government.” Id. These
policies deal with issues outside the scope of the topic of this Note, such as products
liability or strict liability.
132
Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted). This policy attempts to place liability on
blameworthy conduct and is generally applied where harm is caused by a failure to
exercise care or intentionally tortious conduct. Id.
133
Id. This policy has two parts: (1) liability should not be placed on an individual
tortfeasor, even under the showing of fault, if the individual tortfeasor would be liable for a
disproportionate burden; and (2) when two or more persons contributes to the harm,
liability should be allocated among the tortfeasers in accordance with the degree to which
their conduct caused the damage. Id.
134
Id. at 4–5. According to this policy, tort law should function in such a way as to
discourage individuals from engaging in conduct that carries with it excessive risk of
personal injury or property damage. Id.
135
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5. The goal of this policy is to favor situations
where the financial burden imposed by liability can be spread broadly so that no person is
forced to pay a large portion of the damages. Id. For example, in the case of a defective
product, it is argued that liability should be placed on the manufacturer because it can
distribute the loss to a large segment of the pubic by adjusting the price of its product. Id.
136
Id. This policy seeks to shift liability in such a way that one with substantial resources
bears the greater burden of the loss. Id. The rationale for this is that the impact of the
liability will be less-severely felt by one with substantial resources than by one with limited
wealth. Id. As a result, proponents of this principle would argue that an accident victim
with $100 in assets should not have to bear a $100 loss, but rather should be able to shift
that burden to a defendant with over a million dollars in assets. Id.
129
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“Tort law should be administratively convenient and efficient,
and should avoid intractable inquiries.”138
“Accident victims should be fully compensated.”139

Part III applies the foregoing list of policies to the issues that arise
when comparative fault is expanded to include intentional
misconduct.140 By employing a policy-based approach, a deeper
understanding of the effects of expanding comparative fault—
particularly a plaintiff’s ability to recover full and adequate
compensation—may be achieved.141
III. ANALYSIS
The American legal system has been described as an “aesthetic
enterprise.”142 This characterization expands the definition of “aesthetic”
beyond mere beauty and art to encompass a “description of those
recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of
law.”143 One form is the dimension of doctrines and rules promulgated
Id. at 5–6. This policy may be used to support a variety of views, such as requiring
tort law to provide clear notice of the type of conduct encouraged and prohibited, to carve
out objective standards, rather than subjective, when applying tort principles, and to
fashion bright-line rules when possible, rather than flexible guidelines that may make jury
decisions difficult. Id. at 6.
138
Id. The goal of this policy is to mold tort rules in such a way as to ensure efficient use
of the money spent on accident compensation by creating legal standards that are not so
complex or uncertain that the expending of judicial resources and litigation costs become
unnecessary. Id.
139
Id. at 7. Public policy demands that accident victims obtain the financial resources
needed to overcome their injuries and, therefore, the goal of this principle is to encourage
tort rules to be fashioned and applied in furtherance of these policy demands, even if it is at
the expense of other tort policies, such as fault apportionment. Id.
140
See infra Part III.A (analyzing this issue by applying the Johnson and Gunn policy
goals). However, note that these policies often come into conflict with one another when
applied to varying situations. See Robert F. Blomquist, Re-enchanting Torts, 56 S. C. L. REV.
481, 497–500 (2005); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047
(2002) (discussing public policies as the energy aesthetics that sometimes compete with one
another).
141
See infra Part III.B (arguing that the result of including intentional torts will be to
return to the harsh realities of contributory negligence that prevented plaintiffs from fully
recovering for their damages).
142
Schlag, supra note 140, at 1049. Describing this statement further, Schlag wrote,
“B]efore the ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can even be articulated, let alone
realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within which those projects
will have to do their work.” Id. See also Blomquist, supra note 140, at 490–505 (discussing
Schlag’s characterization of the American legal system as an aesthetic enterprise).
143
Schlag, supra note 140, at 1051. In his article, Schlag describes four aesthetics of
American tort law: the grid aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspective aesthetic, and
the dissociative aesthetic. Id. at 1051–52. The grid aesthetic sees law as divided into
137
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by courts and legislatures.144 Another is the realm entailing the
principles, policies, and values advanced by these laws.145 Because
“[p]recedents expand or contract in accordance with the push and pull of
policy and principle[,]” Part III.A analyzes, in the context of Johnson and
Gunn’s list of public policy goals, the inclusion of intentional torts when
comparing fault.146 Afterward, Part III.B reviews the policy reasons that
caused courts to move away from contributory negligence when
developing comparative fault and examines whether including
intentional torts furthers this aim.147
A. A Policy-Based Approach to Deciding Whether to Include Intentional Torts
When Comparing Fault
Part II provided background for the many legal bases that courts
have proffered for either including or not including intentional torts
when comparing fault.148
In order to determine the practical
consequences of each approach, Part III analyzes the arguments for and
against inclusion, within the context of the policy goals that tort law
seeks to advance.149 The discussion that follows entails all forms of
intentional tort inclusion—whether between a plaintiff and defendant, or
between joint defendants.150 Accordingly, Part III discusses the goal of
tort law—to compensate injured victims, along with the other policybased goals of tort law provided by Johnson and Gunn, to set forth a

doctrines and rules that are subdivided into elements that make up the bright-line rules,
approaches, and definitions of the law. Id. at 1051. The energy aesthetic sees law as
conflicting policies, principles, values, and politics that interact to shape our legal system.
Id. at 1051–52. The perspective aesthetic views law as shaping and changing in its identity
in relation to point of view. Id. at 1052. Finally, the dissociative aesthetic is where the
former three aesthetics collapse into one another rendering the law without determinable
identities, relations, or perspectives. Id.
144
See id.
145
See id.
146
Id. at 1051–52; see also infra Part III.A (analyzing the policy goals of tort law provided
by Johnson and Gunn).
147
See infra Part III.B (describing the conceptual failure of allowing intentional torts to be
included in comparative fault analysis).
148
See supra Part II (providing a comprehensive background to the development of
comparative fault and its expansion to include intentional torts by some states).
149
See infra Parts III.A.1–6. Note that in the interest of efficiency, some of these policies
will be discussed in tandem with one another in this Note.
150
See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (describing the hypothetical situations of
both types of comparisons when intentional torts are included in comparative fault).
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framework for deciding whether states should include intentional torts
in their comparative fault systems.151
1.

Liability Should Be Based on, and Be Proportional to, Fault

The first two policy goals of tort law proposed by Johnson and Gunn
are that liability should be both based on, and in proportion to, fault.152
These goals prioritize the interests of defendants by seeking to ensure
that they are not disproportionately liable for a plaintiff’s damages.153 As
a result, the inclusion of intentional torts seems to greatly advance these
two aims by holding all culpable parties accountable, regardless of the
type of tortious act committed.154
However, if “proportionate fault” is viewed not just as an issue of
percentages but as a matter of moral culpability, then including
intentional torts does not further these two policies.155 Some states argue
that “[w]here society wants certain conduct absolutely prohibited and
discouraged, apportionment of fault is not appropriate.”156
This
contention relates back to the view that intentional torts are different in
kind than negligent acts because they require a purposeful state of mind
and warrant higher accountability.157 To compare the two, then, is
“conceptually incoherent[.]”158
See supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text (listing the twelve tort-law policies set
forth by Johnson and Gunn). See also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (discussing the priority
in tort law—to compensate victims).
152
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (explaining that the goal of tort law is
to have liability based on fault and to allocate it proportionally to one’s fault).
153
See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (describing the aims of these two goals
in making defendants liable for their proportionate share of fault).
154
See Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998) (stating that
including intentional torts accomplishes a fairer and more equitable result).
155
Prosser and Keeton explained that the development of tort law has been shaped by
the moral aspect of a defendant’s conduct. KEETON ET AL, supra note 18, at 21. The authors
provided the following commentary:
The oppressor, the perpetrator of outrage, the knave, the liar, the
scandal-monger, the person who does spiteful harm for its own sake,
the selfish aggressor who deliberately disregards and overrides the
interests of neighbors, may expect to find that the courts of society, no
less than the opinion of society itself, condemn the conduct.
Id.
156
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 175–76 (Minn. 1986); see also supra note 87
(discussing the opinion in Florenzano).
157
See Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 576 (Okla. 2005) (explaining the argument
that intentional torts are different in kind, from negligence, and not just different in
degrees); see also supra note 85 (discussing the Parret decision). But see Westerbeke, supra
note 87, at 189. Westerbeke noted in his article that “not all intentional torts fit the ‘high
culpability’ stereotype.” Id. at 190. Describing a situation where this would be the case, he
151
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To illustrate, returning to the hypothetical situations in Part I, the
rapist who committed a purposeful act of violence against the victim
should not be allowed to shift any liability, even though the victim may
have been negligent, because his act was far more egregious according to
standards of morality.159 The same would be true in the hypothetical
scenario also presented in Part I, involving joint defendants.160 The
rapist who deliberately injured the victim should not be permitted to
benefit by shifting liability to the owner of the property who merely
failed to comply with a duty.161 When viewed in this light, inclusion of
intentional torts does not further the goals of tort liability that suggest
that liability should be based on, and in proportion to, fault.162
2.

Tort Law Should Deter Accidents

Some critics have argued that the goal of deterring wrongful conduct
is weakened when intentional torts are included in comparative fault
analysis.163 Theoretically, where an individual knows that he cannot
stated that a person may act under a reasonable but incorrect belief that he needs to use
force to protect himself. Id. For example, a property owner might detain another whom
the owner incorrectly believes stole his personal property. Id. The mistaken belief to use
force may also arise when a person “resorts to force to defend himself in response to an
unreasonable, but not malicious or reckless, belief in the need for such force.” Id.
Furthermore, “the acts of children, insane persons and others may meet the technical
definition of intentional despite a virtual lack of any moral culpability.” Id. The situations
described by Westerbeke are likely the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, most
cases of intentional misconduct will involve acts of higher moral culpability than
negligence.
158
Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also
supra note 84 (discussing the opinion in Shin).
159
See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical situation of a man raping a woman and
trying to shift liability by claiming that she was negligent).
160
See supra Part I (discussing a second hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff is not
at fault, but where there are two defendants—one who committed the intentional act and
one who acted negligently).
161
Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979) (stating that intentional tortfeasors
should not be able to reap the benefits of comparative fault by reducing their own liability
by the negligence of a joint defendant).
162
See Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. 1995) (holding that the
plaintiff’s negligence could not be compared to the defendant’s intentional act because
there is a “qualitative difference” between willful and wanton misconduct and simple
negligence).
163
See Wright, supra note 48, at 561. Wright stated that “comparing the fault of
intentional and negligent actors under a comparative fault approach leads to underaccountability for the intentional actors, because an intentional wrongdoer’s fault can be
reduced.” Id. Wright continued, “[i]f an actor intended the wrong, it is unfair to mitigate
responsibility for the damages because the location of the intended event is poorly
maintained.” Id. Therefore, Wright maintains that intentional tortfeasors will not be held
properly accountable “if the consequences of an intentional act are reduced by another’s
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shift liability under comparative fault to either the plaintiff or to another
defendant, he will be less likely to commit an intentional harmful act.164
Potential negligent actors will likewise be deterred because anticipating
that liability may be shifted to an intentional tortfeasor eviscerates the
negligent defendant’s duty to prevent harm.165
Nevertheless, intentional misconduct can be deterred using other
methods, even when intentional torts are included in comparative
fault.166 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined in Blazovic that the
punitive damage award was not subject to allocation and existed solely
to punish the intentional tortfeasor.167 Many intentional acts, such as
assault and battery, are subject to criminal sanctions.168 Therefore, the
deterrence argument against including intentional torts seems to be
weakened, at least with respect to intentional actors.169
Negligent tortfeasors, on the other hand, will likely continue to be
under-deterred if intentional misconduct is included in comparative
fault analysis.170 In the hypothetical situation above, where the rapist
and owner of the property are both at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, if
the owner knows that he can shift most of the liability to the rapist, he
has less incentive to protect future victims from harm.171 Furthermore,
negligent conduct.” Id. See also Davies, 602 P.2d at 611 (stating that intentional tortfeasors
should not be able to benefit by shifting responsibility to others parties).
164
See Wright, supra note 48, at 561.
165
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stewart stated as follows:
Given defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all.
Id. He continued by admonishing, “[s]uch an application of comparative principles would
eviscerate [the] defendant[’]s[] duty to prevent such a wrong.” Id. See also Brown &
Morgan, supra note 88, at 510 (stating that if intentional torts are included in comparative
schemes, “[t]he negligent defendant’s incentive to protect will be diminished because his
amount of apportioned fault will likely be minimal.”).
166
The other methods of deterring intentional misconduct include punitive damages and
criminal sanctions. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231–32 (N.J. 1991).
167
Id.
168
For instance, intentional torts such as battery, assault, or false imprisonment are also
considered criminal misconduct and are subject to prosecution in criminal courts.
169
See Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 231–32; see also supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text
(explaining the facts and holding in this opinion).
170
Wright, supra note 48, at 561; see also supra note 163 (discussing how intentional
tortfeasors become under-deterred when intentional torts are included).
171
See supra Part I (discussing a second hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff is not
at fault, but where there are two defendants—one who committed the intentional act and
one who acted negligently); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 14; Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing, Corp., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972). This is the
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unlike the rapist who can be punished with punitive damages and
criminal liability, the owner is subject to no other sanctions.172 Therefore,
including intentional torts fails to deter all potential tortfeasors, whereas
not including them provides motivation for both negligent and
intentional actors to refrain from tortious conduct.173
3.

The Costs of Accidents Should Be Spread Broadly and Shifted to
Those Best Able to Bear Them

Public policy also seeks to spread the costs of injuries broadly and to
allocate such costs to those best able to bear them.174 The idea
underlying this goal is that certain parties have more resources than
others in the form of money, assets, and ability to shift their burden to a
larger segment of the population.175 In a products liability case, for
example, the manufacturer of the defective product is likely in the best
position to assume the costs of liability because it is probably a company
with monetary resources that can spread its burden to its customers by
increasing the prices of its goods.176

situation contemplated by the “very-duty rule” used to deter negligent defendants who fail
in their duty to protect a plaintiff from the type of intentional harm giving rise to the
plaintiff’s injuries.
172
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 9–10 (stating that negligence is not enough to give
rise to punitive damages). Detailing what gives rise to an award of punitive damages,
Prosser and Keeton stated that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is
always required for punitive damages.” Id. at 9. In order to give rise to punitive damages,
the circumstances must rise to something more akin to aggravation, outrage, spite, malice,
or fraud. Id. The defendant must have “a fraudulent or evil motive” and must possess “a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others[.]” Id. (footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, even though negligence can reach “gross” degrees, because negligence is not
deliberate and wanton, it is not enough to constitute punitive damages. Id. at 10.
173
Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (discussing that the duty to prevent harm
will be diminished by including intentional torts).
174
See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (detailing these policy goals and the
rationales behind their purposes).
175
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5 (explaining the rationale behind this policy
goal).
176
See id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 24. Speaking about such defendants’
ability to bear the loss, Keeton and Prosser stated as follows:
This is not so much a matter of their respective wealth, although
certainly juries, and sometimes judges, are not indisposed to favor the
poor against the rich. Rather it is a matter of their capacity to avoid the
loss, or to absorb it, or to pass it along and distribute it in smaller
portions among a larger group.
Id. The authors describe the defendants in many tort cases as “public utilities, industrial
corporations, commercial enterprises, automobile owners, and others who by means of
rates, prices, taxes or insurance are best able to distribute to the public at large the risks and
losses which are inevitable in a complex civilization.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 6

294

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Applying this reasoning to the hypothetical situation in Part I,
involving the two defendants, the owner of the property is likely the
party with the most money and greatest ability to spread its burden to a
larger segment of the population.177 The rapist, on the other hand, could
very well be insolvent or absent from the litigation because his identity is
unknown.178 Therefore, if the victim brings a negligence claim against
the owner and intentional torts are included when fault is compared, the
owner will shift his liability to the rapist who cannot bear the costs of the
plaintiff’s damages, thus leaving the victim without means of
recovery.179 But if the owner cannot shift his liability to the rapist, he
will assume the costs of damages and spread them broadly by increasing
the prices of his goods, raising the rents of his tenants, or by other
means.180 Including intentional torts when comparing fault results in an
impediment both to spreading costs broadly and to spreading costs to
those best able to bear them.181
4.

Tort Law Should Be Predictable, Efficient, and Convenient

Another goal of tort law is to create a system with predictable and
workable standards so that societal costs and judicial resources are not
unnecessarily expended.182 Some commentators have argued that
including intentional torts in comparative fault furthers this goal by
making it so that judges do not have to determine whether an act was
intentional or merely reckless in order to include it when allocating
fault.183 Including intentional acts is said to clear up confusion and allow
courts to operate more effectively.184
See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (explaining this hypothetical situation).
Speaking to cases where the intentional actor is insolvent or unknown, Prosser and
Keeton stated that, “[r]ather than leave the loss on the shoulders of the individual plaintiff,
who may be ruined by it, the courts have tended to find reasons to shift it to the
defendants.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 24. In other words, courts traditionally
negatively view denying a plaintiff means of recovery.
179
See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (stating that “the policies of spreading
the burden of loss and fairly compensating the injured plaintiff, which legislatures and
courts sought to advance with the adoption of comparative fault, are undermined[ when
intentional torts are included].”); see also Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979)
(stating that intentional tortfeasors should not be able to reap benefits of comparative fault
by shifting any of their liability).
180
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5 (describing this result with respect to
defendants such as manufacturers).
181
See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12.
182
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5.
183
Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190–91 (stating that including intentional torts when
comparing fault reduces confusion by making it so that judges do not have to classify an
act as intentional or merely reckless). For cases that have involved a combination of
intentional and negligent torts, see, for example, Coffman v. Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868 (Ind.
177
178
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However, including intentional torts creates uncertainty because it is
applied in varying forms and degrees.185 Some states include intentional
misconduct only when comparing the fault of joint defendants, whereas
others include intentional misconduct when comparing fault between
plaintiffs and defendants.186 Other states include intentional torts when
comparing fault only if the negligent actor breached a special duty to
protect the plaintiff from intentional harm, or when culpable parties are
all named as defendants.187 Consequently, due to varying approaches
among the states, intentional tortfeasors will not know to what degree
they will be accountable, nor will negligent defendants understand the
extent of their duties or their liability for breaching those duties.188 The

2004) (comparing failure to disclose with intentional fraud); Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So.2d
943 (La. 2003) (comparing the intentional battery at a bar fight with the negligence of the
bar for not providing adequate security); Hanson v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 2002)
(comparing the intentional killing by the defendant with the Department of Criminal
Justice’s negligence in not disclosing the defendant’s criminal background); Limbaugh v.
Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001) (comparing an intentional assault on a resident
of a nursing home with the nursing home’s failure to adequately supervise the assailant);
Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001) (comparing a decedent’s intentional suicide with
the jail’s failure to properly supervise him); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074
(Idaho 2000) (comparing an employee’s intentional prank with the negligence of the
employer’s lack of supervision); Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998)
(comparing an intentional murder with the city’s 911 emergency operator’s failure to
timely notify the police of impending danger); Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998)
(comparing the intentional physical and sexual assault on the plaintiff with the negligence
of the owners of the mall on which the assault took place); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d
222 (N.J. 1991) (comparing the plaintiff’s negligence in provoking a confrontation and the
restaurant’s failure to provide adequate lighting and security, to the defendants’ intentional
assault on the plaintiff); Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d
652 (Haw. App. 1998) (comparing the intentional killing of the plaintiff’s daughter with the
negligence of the apartment complex for allowing the killer to enter the decedent’s
apartment); Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. App. Ct.
1998) (comparing the intentional sexual assault of one defendant with the negligent hiring
of the tortfeasor by the other defendant); and Comeau v. Lucas, 455 A.D.2d 674 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982) (comparing an intentional assault with the negligence of both the plaintiff and
the host of a party).
184
Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190–91.
185
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (describing the different approaches
throughout the states when comparing intentional torts in comparative fault schemes).
186
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (detailing the different approaches in
several states that include intentional torts when comparing fault).
187
See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (giving two examples of states that have
adopted these more narrow approaches to comparing intentional fault).
188
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5–6 (stating that this policy exists so that
persons are not forced to act at their own peril because they do not know what the law
requires of them, and also stating that clear instruction should be provided as to what
conduct is expected).
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legal consequences of particular conduct thus become difficult to
predict.189
Furthermore, an efficient and convenient tort system accomplishes
the task of compensating victims when they have suffered injuries.190 As
demonstrated more fully in Part III.A.5, including intentional torts can
significantly impede a plaintiff’s ability to recover from liable
defendants.191 Suffice it to say that by including intentional torts in
comparing fault, plaintiffs will often not receive full compensation for
their injuries.192 Therefore, to include intentional torts in comparative
fault gives rise to a less-efficient and unpredictable tort system.193
5.

Victims Should Be Fully Compensated for Their Damages

Johnson and Gunn incorporate into their list of policy goals the need
to compensate victims, which is one of tort law’s highest priorities.194
189
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5. The goal of this policy is to not create legal
standards that are so complex or uncertain that costs and judicial resources are
unnecessarily expended. Id. Including intentional torts can give rise to complexity and
uncertainty in that some situations warrant allocation and others not, and also the fact that
intentional actors will often times be absent from the litigation. Id. See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 23. Moreover, as Prosser and Keeton stated:
[i]t does not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all
human wrongs. The obvious limitations upon the time of the courts,
the difficulty in many cases of ascertaining the real facts or of
providing any effective remedy, have meant that there must be some
selection of those more serious injuries which have the prior claim to
redress and are dealt with most easily.
Id. As a practical matter, the ability to effectively administer the law may have to exist at
the expense of other competing policies. See id. In comparative fault analysis, for instance,
it may be necessary for complete fairness and accuracy in allocating fault to give way to
administrative convenience and efficiency. See id. However, compare id. with Westerbeke,
supra note 87, at 190–91 (discussing the confusion caused by excluding intentional torts).
190
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing scholars that maintain that
tort law prioritizes plaintiff compensation).
191
See infra Part III.A.5 (analyzing the policy in tort law of compensating victims for their
injuries).
192
See infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text (illustrating how plaintiffs are denied
compensation when intentional torts are included in comparing fault).
193
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 6 (stating that tort law discourages “the
pursuit of what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are such that
even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk that an
erroneous result will be reached.”).
194
See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson and Gunn’s description
of this policy goal); see also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (describing the need to
compensate plaintiffs as being one of the highest priorities in tort). But see JOHNSON &
GUNN, supra note 129, at 185–86 (illustrating how the goals of compensating victims and
deterring tortious behavior conflict with one another). In the context of a hypothetical case
where a defendant causes the death of young children, Johnson and Gunn show how
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Victims run a greater risk of not being fully compensated when
intentional torts are included in comparative fault for two reasons.195
First, including intentional torts allows the intentional actor to reduce his
liability by the plaintiff’s negligence.196 Second, including intentional
torts leaves victims without recourse because intentional actors are often
insolvent or unknown.197 In the latter situation, the negligent defendant
can shift his liability to the intentional actor and leave the plaintiff
without recovery.198 The result of either of these situations is that the
plaintiff becomes “victimized twice.”199
prioritizing the goal of deterring tortious behavior above the goal of compensating victims,
or vice versa, reaches different outcomes. Id. at 186. If the only goal were compensation of
victims, the measure of damages would be nothing because, although the parents are heartbroken, they lost nothing financially. Id. In fact, for the parents to receive compensation in
such an instance would not make them whole and may even cause them to suffer
emotional distress by knowing that they benefited from the death of a child. Id. If
deterrence of tortious behavior is the priority, the death of these children should amount to
very high damages because of the egregious nature of the harm caused. Id. Therefore,
even though some commentators and scholars have maintained that compensating victims
is the highest priority of tort law, there may be instances when it should yield to other
priorities. See id.
195
See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that including intentional torts in comparative fault “depriv[es]
the faultless plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all.”).
196
See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text (discussing the Blazovic case that
permitted a group of defendants to reduce their liability to an amount equivalent to the
plaintiff’s negligence).
197
See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (stating that including intentional torts
often results in plaintiffs not recovering because the defendants are insolvent or unknown).
The authors of this article stated that in most cases, including intentional torts in a
comparative fault and several liability jurisdiction will deny the plaintiff recovery. Id. In
such a situation, the jury will apportion fault to the negligent and intentional defendants,
with the greater amount of fault attributed to the intentional tortfeasor. Id. As a result,
“[t]his effectively precludes the plaintiff from recovering for his injuries because the
intentional tortfeasor will most likely be insolvent or unavailable.” Id. at 511.
198
This situation illustrates the ‘empty chair’ defense[.]” See supra note 100 and
accompanying text (discussing this concept). Describing this defense, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that, “an ‘empty chair’ defense is applicable when there is, or
may be, a viable theory for assessing fault against a nonparty, i.e., a ‘person’ under [the
statute], but for some reason that person is not a party to the lawsuit or recovery is not
permitted against that person.” Hanson v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D. 2002). The
obvious result of using this defense in jurisdictions that allow it is that a defendant can
potentially reduce his liability by a great degree by shifting fault to an unidentifiable or
immune contributor to the plaintiff’s damages. By not allowing intentional torts to be
compared to negligent torts, plaintiffs can recover their entire damages from a negligent
actor.
199
See E-mail from Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at the Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer in Salt
Lake City, Utah, to Senator Ross I. Romero, Utah Legislator (February 5, 2007, 5:58 p.m.
MST) (on file with author). In lobbying the Utah Legislature to exclude intentional acts
from the comparative fault statute, members of the Utah Trial Lawyers Association have
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In states that do not include intentional torts, however, the negligent
defendant can be liable for the entire amount of the victim’s damages.200
This provides the plaintiff with a known and solvent party through
whom he can be compensated.201 Critics of this result argue that it gives
rise to over-accountability for negligent defendants.202 In response to
this contention Ellen M. Bublick has stated:
[S]light negligence can produce great harm and,
therefore, great liability. But tort law is designed to
provide compensation for wrongful injuries, and until
some rule of nature prevents plaintiffs from being
injured out of proportion to defendant’s fault,
compensation to injured plaintiffs must continue to be
based on the actual harm caused by that fault.203
In other words, the high priority of a victim’s need to be
compensated for all harm caused outweighs the unfairness created by
holding a culpable defendant accountable for more than his proportional
share of the fault.204 Therefore, in the interest of advancing the goal to
compensate injured victims, states should not include intentional torts in
their comparative fault systems.
stated that including intentional torts “will produce a fundamentally unsound result—
victims of otherwise preventable [tortious] misconduct will be victimized a ‘second
time’. . . inasmuch as the [intentional tortfeasor] will not be brought to justice and the
victim will be deprived of compensation because that [tortfeasor] escaped justice!” Id.
Moreover, Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court argued the same when he eloquently
provided the following commentary:
Given defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all.
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
200
See Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 628 (Neb. 2001) (holding the
county liable for all of the damages caused by the murderers of the plaintiff’s daughter).
201
See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the need for this policy and how
it furthers a system of tort law).
202
See Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652, 662 (Haw.
App. 1998) (reasoning that including intentional torts in comparative fault accomplishes “a
fairer and more equitable result[]”).
203
Bublick, supra note 111, at 435.
204
Id. at 437–38. However, in her article, Bublick suggests that the issue of inadequate
victim recovery inherent in including intentional torts can be remedied by expanding
victim compensation programs. Id. at 437. Bublick also recommends that legislatures
rethink laws that bar insurance coverage for intentional torts. Id. As a result, these
suggestions could provide other avenues for plaintiff recovery. See id.
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Tort law places great emphasis on this policy of compensating
victims.205 To more fairly pay damages to injured plaintiffs was the
reason courts moved away from common law contributory negligence.206
As a result, a tort system that fails to adequately provide relief may be
said to wane in its utility for a civilized society.207 In Part III.B, this
concern is developed further with respect to the consequences of
including intentional torts in comparative fault analysis.208
B. Rethinking the Conceptual Failure of the All-or-Nothing Approach to
Apportioning Fault
The doctrine of contributory negligence created by Butterfield was a
system of all-or-nothing.209 After this decision, plaintiffs who were free
from fault received full compensation,210 but plaintiffs who contributed
to their injuries in any way recovered no percentage of their damages.211
Lou Dobbs characterized this harsh consequence as a “conceptual
failure” on the part of nineteenth-century judges.212
If a modern court applying comparative fault instead of contributory
negligence was to decide the case in Butterfield, the result would be
undoubtedly different.213 Depending on the comparative fault system
adopted, such a court would likely apportion a certain amount of the
liability to the plaintiff who rode his horse too fast and the remaining
liability to the defendant who left the obstruction in the road.214 The
205
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing one of the main priorities of
tort law: to provide relief to injured victims).
206
See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the legislative
decision to adopt comparative negligence was aimed at ameliorating the harsh results of
contributory negligence).
207
See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement and other
authorities that state that one of the primary functions of tort law is to provide
compensation to accident victims).
208
See infra Part III.B.
209
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (discussing Butterfield and its holding).
210
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of contributory
negligence).
211
See supra notes 42 and accompanying text (discussing the harsh results of contributory
negligence).
212
DOBBS, supra note 31, at 234; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing
Dobb’s analysis in more detail).
213
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (explaining the holding and reasoning in
Butterfield).
214
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (giving the facts of this case). Of course,
under different systems, such as the forty-nine percent system, the plaintiff could still stand
to recover nothing if the jury found his fault to be equal to or greater than that of the
defendants. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing modified systems of
comparative fault). Or, under the slight-gross system, if the court decided that the
plaintiff’s negligence was gross, he would also recover nothing. See supra notes 53–55 and

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 6

300

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

plaintiff would then be able to recover at least a percentage of his
damages.215 For the plaintiff, this outcome is far more equitable than
receiving no compensation at all merely because the plaintiff was riding
his horse too fast and, thus, caused a slight percentage of his own
injury.216
In order to fulfill comparative fault’s goal of ameliorating the harsh
results of contributory negligence, any system of fault apportionment
adopted by a state must adequately compensate injured plaintiffs.217 If a
state’s comparative fault system fails in this task and renders plaintiffs
without relief, it returns to the stringent all-or-nothing system that
comparative fault eviscerated.218 Stated another way, if including
intentional torts when comparing fault produces harsh results for
plaintiffs, then adopting that approach amounts to a “conceptual
failure.”219
When intentional torts are included in comparative fault, injured
plaintiffs will suffer severe consequences because they will not be fairly
compensated.220 In the context of joint defendants, the negligent
defendant will be able to shift a greater portion of liability to the
unknown or insolvent intentional tortfeasor and deny the plaintiff
adequate recovery.221 The result is also harsh when a defendant who
intentionally injures the plaintiff is able to reduce his liability by the
plaintiff’s negligence because of the moral disparity between the two
types of conduct.222 Returning to Justice Stewart’s dissent in the Utah
Supreme Court decision of Field v. Boyer Co., this differentiation is

accompanying text (discussing the slight-gross system of comparative fault). Nevertheless,
regardless of which system is implemented, the plaintiff will have a more equitable chance
of recovery than if contributory negligence is employed.
215
See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text (discussing the different approaches to
comparative fault in the United States).
216
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the harsh results of contributory
negligence).
217
See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the adoption of
comparative negligence was aimed at ameliorating the harsh results of contributory
negligence).
218
See supra notes 42–58 and accompanying text (discussing the all-or-nothing approach
of comparative fault and tort law’s development beyond that doctrine).
219
DOBBS, supra note 31, at 234; see also supra notes 43 and accompanying text (discussing
Dobb’s characterization of contributory negligence as a conceptual failure).
220
See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text (describing how plaintiffs are denied
compensation when intentional torts are included in comparative fault analysis).
221
See supra note 197 and accompanying text (explaining that the archetypical situation
involves an intentional tortfeasor who is insolvent or absent).
222
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing states that do not include
intentional torts based on the differences in moral degrees and accountability of negligence
and intentional conduct).
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described by Justice Stewart when he discussed the plurality’s opinion
and stated:
Chief Justice Zimmerman says that where a plaintiff
sues a defendant for assault, battery, conversion, libel, or
any other intentional tort, the law countenances a
shifting of liability to the victim of the tort because the
victim may have been careless. Put more concretely, his
position is that a man sued for rape could reduce his
liability for the injury he caused because the woman
invited the rape by her failure to take reasonable
precautions for her own safety. The same principle
dictates that a person who steals another’s property can
reduce his liability because the victim failed to take
sufficient precautions to protect his property. Chief
Justice Zimmerman’s view turns both morality and the
law on their heads. The [Utah] Legislature never
intended such an absurd result.223
Because of the deliberate nature of intentional acts, any system that
allows an intentionally tortfeasing defendant to reduce his liability by
the victim’s negligence results in inequitable compensation for that
victim.224
The foregoing analysis of the inclusion of intentional torts in the
context of Johnson and Gunn’s tort policy goals, coupled with the fact
that the American tort system assigns a high priority to plaintiff
compensation and actually moved away from contributory negligence to
further that goal, leads to the conclusion that intentional torts should not
be included in comparative fault analysis.225 When they are included,
the aims of tort law are compromised and cease to be accomplished.226
Furthermore, the results on victims are too harsh because they will often
be denied equitable compensation for their injuries.227 States will better
fulfill the objectives of tort law by not including intentional torts when
comparing the fault of culpable parties.

223
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
224
Id.
225
See supra Parts III.A–B (using the framework of policy goals to analyze whether
intentional torts should be included in comparative fault analysis).
226
See supra Parts III.A.1–5 (analyzing the inclusion of intentional torts by applying a
number of policy goals).
227
See supra Part III.B (discussing that including intentional torts produces harsh results
for plaintiffs).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 6

302

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

IV. CONTRIBUTION
In light of the foregoing contention that intentional torts should not
be included in comparative fault analysis, legislatures should draft laws
that draw distinct lines between negligent and intentional misconduct.
Even though most states continue to exclude intentional torts from
comparative fault, many do not set forth explicit divisions between
negligent and intentional misconduct in their statutes.228 The following
amendments and propositions to Utah’s comparative fault statute
illustrate how such divisions may be accomplished.229
§ 78-27-37: Definitions
. . . (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or
omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages
sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its
degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. “Fault” does not mean
intentional or willful acts under this section. “Fault” means an intentional or
willful act only under section 78-27-38A.
Comment
The amendments to § 78-27-37 are to make clear that under this section
intentional torts are excluded from the definition of fault. Only under the
specific instance described in section 78-27-38A can an intentional act be
included in a definition of fault. Nevertheless, under no circumstances can
negligent-type acts be compared to intentional or willful misconduct when
allocating fault under this statute.230
§ 78-27-38: Comparative Negligence
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar
recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or
group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons
immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the
fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault
made under subsection 78-27-39(2).
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the states that do not include
intentional torts when comparing fault).
229
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 et seq. The contributions by the author of this Note
are italicized to distinguish them from the original text of the statute. See id.
230
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (listing decisions in most states that
decided this issue under statutes that were not very clear as to whether or not intentional
torts were included in comparative fault).
228
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(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant
under section 78-27-39.
(4)(a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall,
allocate the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit,
and to any other person identified under subsection 78-27-41(4) for
whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. However, when
the cause of action is based on fault as defined in section 78-27-38(b), fault
cannot be allocated to any party who acts intentionally. Intentional torts can
only be allocated under the circumstances described in section 78-27-38A.231 In
the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor
vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and
convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered
only to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery
from a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to
any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
Comment
This section applies exclusively to causes of action based on fault as defined
in subsection 78-27-37(b). The 78-27-37(b) fault can properly be described as
“negligent-type” conduct that includes products liability and strict liability.
The important distinction is that these acts do not require a willful state of
mind. Intentional or willful torts, on the other hand, are not included under
this section and can only be compared with other intentional or willful acts as
described in section 78-27-38A. The amendments to this section are to make
clear that if a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for an injury that resulted from
an intentional act, but was also caused by a breach of duty, then the negligent
defendant cannot shift liability based on the fault of the intentional actor.
Conversely, if a plaintiff brings a claim alleging an intentional tort against a
defendant, that defendant cannot shift liability based on the fault of a negligent
actor.
Furthermore, these amendments make clear that the fault of an intentional
actor can never be reduced by the fault of a negligent plaintiff. A fact finder
may include the fault of an intentional actor only when all the tortfeasors are
found to have acted intentionally as described in section 78-27-38A.

See supra Part III (describing the unfortunate consequences of allowing intentional
torts to be included when fault is compared).

231
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§ 78-27-38A: Comparative Intentional Fault
(1) “Fault” under this section includes only intentional torts and applies
only when all allocated fault is based on intentional or willful misconduct.
“Fault” as defined under subsection 78-27-37(b) is not included in this section.
(2) A defendant who is found to have acted intentionally or willfully in
causing harm to a plaintiff, or whose intentional or willful act was a substantial
factor in causing harm to the plaintiff, may be jointly and severally liable for his
or her portion of the damages only in comparison to one or more defendants who
are also found to have acted intentionally. The fault of an intentional tortfeasor
defendant cannot be compared with the fault of another defendant as defined in
subsection 78-27-37(b).232
Comment
This section is to make clear that intentional torts are to be compared within
their own sphere of liability and not to be mixed with other forms of fault. If a
plaintiff is bringing a claim based on an intentional act, then any allocation of
fault is subject to this section within the confines of intentional tort analysis. In
other words, this section seeks to create two spheres of comparing fault: one
between intentional acts and the other between negligent-type conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The creation of contributory negligence in the Nineteenth Century
was radical and had detrimental affects on a plaintiff’s ability to recover
damages. In its wake, courts have extracted the progressive idea of
comparing fault and developed it into the more equitable apportionment
systems utilized today. But expanding comparative fault to include
intentional torts results in a return to the harshness that contributory
negligence wrought upon plaintiffs. By including intentional torts in
comparative fault analysis, plaintiffs are denied fair and just
compensation and are forced to suffer because the aims of tort law
cannot be accomplished.
Returning to the first hypothetical situation presented in Part I, if the
rapist’s intentional fault is reduced by the victim’s negligence, the victim
is not equitably compensated. A willful and intentional act, such as
committing rape, carries a higher moral culpability than the victim
merely failing to take precautions or wearing suggestive clothing.
Moreover, to permit the rapist to shift liability to the victim results in
legitimizing the violent act and forcing the victim to defend in court
something that she did. This results in a tort system that does not
provide justice proportional to fault, nor would it adequately deter
232
See H.R. 45, 57th Leg., Gen.F Sess. (Utah 2007) (suggesting similar language as this
proposed amendment to Utah’s Comparative Fault Statute).
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intentional misconduct, create efficient and predictable standards, or
adequately compensate the victim for her injuries.
Likewise, in the second hypothetical scenario presented in Part I, if
the rapist or the owner is permitted to shift liability to the other, the aims
of tort law are not accomplished and the victim is denied compensation.
First, the rapist and the owner are under-deterred by knowing that they
can reduce liability by the others’ fault. Second, this situation results in
unpredictable and inefficient standards because the rapist does not know
to what degree he will be accountable, nor does the owner understand
the extent of his duties or of his liability for breaching those duties.
Third, if the owner is permitted to shift his liability to the rapist, the costs
of compensating the victim are not spread broadly or allocated to the
party best able to bear them. Finally, when the rapist is unknown or
insolvent, the victim is left without compensation because the owner
attributes the greatest proportion of fault to the rapist.
In short, states should maintain clear distinctions between acts that
are negligent and acts that are intentional when comparing fault. By so
doing, the primary aims of tort law may be maximized in their utility for
the benefit of American societies.
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